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1. Introduction  
The central aim of my research is to analyze the “Norwegian model” as an 
example of multi-party peace mediation and evaluate its strengths and limitations. 
The Norwegian case is unique in the extent to which NGOs take part in Norwegian 
foreign relations—a field traditionally limited to sovereign states.  While a 
burgeoning literature addresses the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in conflict resolution, there is currently very little systematic theory on the role of 
state-NGO partnerships in this field.  I attempt to address this deficiency through an 
exploratory case study of Norwegian mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Guatemala, and Sudan.  Using a temporal mediation cycle framework, I compare 
examples of the “Norwegian model” using the method of structured focused 
comparison along several variable dimensions.  Organizing the cases within a cyclical 
framework highlights the various demands of a peace process as the mediation 
evolves, as well as the potential contributions of various third party actors.  Based on 
the empirical findings from these three cases, I evaluate four hypothesized potential 
strengths and four potential limitations of the “Norwegian model” of peace 
mediation.  
The results of the present study indicate that the proposed “model” is better 
described as a fluid partnership that reflects a shared set of values about the 
boundaries of interaction between the public and private spheres.  There exists no 
recipe for the “Norwegian model,” and success on the ground owes far more to the 
characteristics of the conflicting parties than to the efforts of the mediators.  In 
addition, the presence (or absence) of a powerful actor capable of enforcing 
implementation proved decisive to the overall outcome following the signing of a 
negotiated agreement in each of the three cases studied.  Nevertheless, the cases 
illustrate that the Norwegian state and NGO actors provided a valuable contribution 
to conflict resolution efforts when able to combine the resources and legitimacy of 
the state with the moral authority and local presence of the NGOs.  In sum, the 
Norwegian role in peace mediation is potentially positive, but certainly limited.   
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1.1 What is the “Norwegian model” and why is it important? 
What is commonly known as the “Norwegian model,” a phrase coined by 
former State Secretary Jan Egeland, describes a pattern of cooperation between the 
Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs in peace negotiations, evident from at 
least the early 1990’s (Dobinson and Dale 2000:63; Matlary 2002:46).  The model 
depends on the close historical, and often personal, links between the “Big Five” 
NGOs and the Norwegian government.1  The contours of the “Norwegian model” 
have been extensively researched within the domestic academic literature, yet the 
model remains relatively unknown abroad.  However, given the explosive growth in 
NGOs globally, virtually all states in the international system now grapple with the 
challenges of government-NGO cooperation.  In this sense, the “Norwegian model” 
may prove relevant for a variety of states as an example of relatively institutionalized 
cooperation. 
The basic premise of the “Norwegian model,” cooperation between states and 
NGOs, is not uniquely Norwegian at all, however.  For example, Italy and the Holy 
See engaged in close cooperation with the Roman Catholic NGO Sant’Egidio in the 
peace process for Mozambique, leading to the signing of a formal agreement exactly 
one year prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords (Bartoli 1999:248-249; Jackson 
2005:153-176).  The Atlanta-based Carter Center, led by former US president Jimmy 
Carter, has also garnered attention for several successful mediation efforts, and the 
Center also maintains relatively close ties to the US government (Brinkley 1995:90-
98; Taulbee and Crickmore 2003:157-168). Nevertheless, the “Norwegian model” 
appears to include a more institutionalized and interdependent state-NGO relationship 
than exists elsewhere.  That Norwegian state funds account for the majority of the 
“Big Five” NGOs’ operating budgets would be unthinkable in the United States, for 
example.  
                                              
1 The “Big Five” include Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid, the Norwegian Red Cross, The Norwegian 
Refugee Council and Save the Children Norway. 
 6 
Two trends in international relations suggest an analysis of the “Norwegian 
model” would prove useful beyond Norway’s borders.  The first is the exponential 
growth in NGOs worldwide over the past two decades.  In addition, the share of civil 
wars, as well as international conflicts involving a violent internal struggle, continues 
to grow in relation to the number of interstate wars. This poses formidable obstacles 
to diplomatic practices originally developed for interaction among sovereign states.  
The increasing importance of non-state actors in violent conflict forces third party 
mediators to adapt existing diplomatic strategies based on state sovereignty to a 
context with more fluid boundaries and complex interrelations. In Norway, these 
trends combine for a form of peace mediation that includes states and NGOs as 
mediators in civil conflict.   
1.2 The effectiveness of Norwegian peace mediation in 
civil conflicts 
Cooperation with Norwegian NGOs allows the Norwegian state to 
simultaneously engage non-state actors at the negotiation table and channel 
controversial aid and assistance through trusted NGOs with local networks and a long 
history of involvement in the conflict region.  While the NGOs gain both access to 
the political channels needed to reach a peace agreement and a stable source of 
funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian government 
is able to avoid directly financing armed non-state groups which its allies designate as 
foreign terrorist organizations.  This represents an example of Norway’s concern for 
the international effects of peace mediation.  The complex, interdependent 
relationship between the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Norwegian NGOs may 
thus exemplify a pragmatic compromise to the contradictions posed by an 
international system in which diplomatic practice has yet to comprehend the 
significance of non-state actors in international conflict.   
The “Norwegian model” of NGO-state cooperation may be uniquely suited to 
the mediation of intrastate conflicts for four reasons: 
 7 
1. Deniability: if politically necessary, the parties can deny the existence of high-
level negotiations.  Likewise, the Norwegian state can initially sidestep the 
issue of the non-state actor’s legitimacy by supporting a Track II process.   
2. Local knowledge: the Norwegian NGO can utilize its knowledge base and 
networks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the conflict and identify 
prospective negotiators among the warring parties. 
3. Trusted mediator: the NGO is more likely than the Norwegian state to have 
established trust among the parties, owing to the NGO’s long-term 
involvement in the region.  Thus, the NGO is likely to be more readily 
accepted as a mediator than the Norwegian state as such.  
4. Streamlined coordination: this system of cooperation is relatively 
institutionalized, contributing to a more coherent mediation policy than would 
likely occur if the Norwegian state and the Norwegian NGO(s) each operated 
independently. 
Conversely, I have identified four counterarguments which merit equal 
consideration.  The following list outlines the potential drawbacks of the “Norwegian 
model”: 
1. Democratic incompatibility: by supporting the NGO-led peace process, the 
Norwegian government cedes foreign policy sovereignty to an NGO that is not 
democratically accountable to the Norwegian people. 
2. Mutual aims critical: the “Norwegian model” depends crucially on mutual 
agreement regarding the aims and procedures of mediation. Where this 
condition does not hold, the model breaks down.   
3. Diplomats overnight: NGO representatives often lack formal diplomatic 
training.  While this may lead to more creative and flexible problem-solving, 
NGO mediators may be nonetheless insufficiently prepared for the diplomatic 
complexity of their work.   
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4. Mediators without muscle: neither the Norwegian government, nor the 
partner NGOs are able to guarantee implementation with the terms of a peace 
agreement.  Thus, the “Norwegian model” is more likely to produce formal 
agreements without any teeth than a peace process involving mediators with 
greater military and economic power.  
The above eight factors are by no means mutually exclusive.  I intend to 
highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the model and its effectiveness in the 
mediation of civil wars through a structured focused comparison of three instances of 
mediation.  The format of the rest of the paper is as follows:  In the second chapter, I 
review the existing literature on state-NGO peace mediation, addressing the lack of 
systematic theory on this particular topic.  That is, while certain aspects of NGO 
mediation and state mediation are considered separately, the literature is rather thin 
on the subject of state-NGO mediation, consisting mainly of descriptive accounts of 
specific mediation attempts.  The third chapter outlines the methodology for the case 
studies to follow, including the choice of cases, mode of analysis and sources of data.  
The fourth chapter consists of the three individual case studies: Norwegian peace 
mediation in the Middle East (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Guatemala, and Sudan, 
respectively.  The fifth chapter compares the results of the three case studies along 
the variable dimensions outlined in the methods chapter and assesses the proposed 
strengths and limitations.  Finally, I conclude with an analysis of the implications of 
the results for the future of the Norwegian state-NGO peace mediation and the 
prospects for exporting the “Norwegian model” abroad. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
There exists very little systematic theory on the subject of state-NGO peace 
mediation and existing research fails to integrate both the motivations of the mediator 
and the outcome of mediation.  More commonly, the theoretical literature adopts the 
perspective of either the state or the NGO as a mediator, while the literature on state-
NGO mediation attempts to extract “lessons learned” from single case studies.  In the 
following chapter, I put forward an integrative theoretical framework for 
understanding both the “input” and the “output” dimensions of mediation, building 
upon existing theory on the domestic sources of foreign policy and the effectiveness 
of multiparty mediation.  This discussion provides the background context for 
understanding the cases to follow. 
While Putnam’s (1988) concept of two-level games opened up the domestic 
context of international negotiators to scrutiny, the same has not occurred for third 
party mediators.  This represents a hole in the mediation literature that scholars of 
political science have largely neglected thus far.  However, Joseph Nye’s concept of 
“soft power,” though only fleetingly applied to mediation, provides a rational choice 
explanation for Norway’s role as a peace mediator.  Inspired by the rational choice 
theory of neoliberal institutionalism, soft power refers to a state’s “attractive power,” 
and derives from a state’s: 
…Culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it 
lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen 
as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye 2004:11). 
Nye mentions Norway only briefly in his book, but the concept of soft power 
provides a rationale for why peace mediation may in fact advance the Norwegian 
national interest; as Nye explains, “Norway’s place at so many negotiating tables 
elevates its usefulness and value to larger countries,” (2004:10).  Princen accepts the 
idea behind the “soft power” rationale for mediation, but argues that seemingly 
neutral mediators may also have “religious or philosophical” interests in serving as 
mediators, or may simply have nothing better to do (1992:49-50).  I advocate 
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Princen’s view of the motives for mediation, but unlike Princen, argue that the 
various rationales for peace mediation have significant consequences for its 
implementation and their implications deserve consideration.  Regarding mediation 
outcomes, Crocker et al.’s Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World 
(1999) generalizes about the utility and effectiveness of multiparty mediation based 
on a compilation of qualitative case studies.  I adopt their theoretical framework of 
linking multiparty mediation to the temporal concept of a conflict cycle and specify 
the implications of the Crocker et al. theory for Norway. I compare these to Egeland’s 
argument on the comparative advantages of small states as peacemakers, relative to 
superpowers. 
The following chapter consists of two parts.  In the first part, I review the 
literature on Norwegian foreign policy history in order to provide a historical 
background and domestic context for the subsequent case studies.  In the second part 
of the chapter, I discuss the Crocker et al. (1999) framework for multiparty mediation 
and present a series of potential strengths and limitations of Norwegian state-NGO 
peace mediation.  
2.1 Norwegian Foreign Policy 
In his review of Norwegian foreign relations from the Middle Ages to the 
present, Olav Riste identifies three phases: a “‘classic’ neutralism” in international 
affairs, from Norway’s emergence as a sovereign state in 1905 to the dawn of World 
War I; a “moralistic advocacy of international law” during the interwar years; and the 
embrace of “active internationalism” following the German occupation of World War 
II and subsequent membership in NATO (Riste 2005:206).  Riste argues that since 
the end of the Cold War, the former two strands of Norwegian foreign policy have re-
emerged in force, creating a conflict of priorities (2005:275).  Both the isolationist 
trend and the emphasis on military alliance membership reflect a broader ideological 
turn to political realism.  While these two strands advocate diametrically opposed 
policy, the motivating factors for each stem from a concern for Norway’s national 
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interest.  The “missionary impulse” Riste identifies (2005:256), however, points to an 
alternative theoretical inspiration; namely, idealism.  Tension between these two 
theoretical paradigms forms an underlying current running through debates on EU 
membership, Norway’s participation in NATO-led ISAF operations in Afghanistan 
(Toje 17 January 2008), and not least, Norway’s role as a peace mediator. 
Norway’s identity as a peacemaker has deep roots within domestic society, 
reflecting the influence of a Lutheran missionary history, a traditional concern for 
humanistic values (Dobinson and Dale 2000:48), and the efforts of prominent 
historical figures, including Fridtjof Nansen’s aid to refugees of World War I.  
During the 1990’s, Norway emerged as an international peacemaker through several 
high profile mediation efforts, in particular, the signing of the Oslo Accords for the 
Israeli-Palestinian (hereafter, the Middle East) peace process.  In addition to its 
engagement in the Middle East, Norway solidified its standing as a mediator through 
intervention in Guatemala, Mali, Cyprus, the Balkans, Sudan, and Colombia, and 
unofficial initiatives in Haiti and Eritrea-Ethiopia (Dobinson and Dale 2000:45; 
Matlary 2002:8, 49-50).  While much has been written in the international mediation 
literature about the Oslo Accords for the Middle East, Norway’s role in a myriad of 
other peace processes receives only passing attention outside of the domestic arena.   
The main elements of the Norwegian approach to peacemaking include its 
prioritization as a key foreign policy objective, the tremendous support among 
domestic constituents for Norway’s role as a peace mediator, the Norwegian 
government’s willingness to share responsibility for mediation with NGO leaders, 
and the government’s willingness to engage in dialogue with the parties to any 
conflict (Dobinson and Dale 2000:58-59), regardless of their complicity in the 
violence or designation as terrorist organizations.  Engagement in peace mediation 
strengthens many Norwegians’ self-image of their country as a force for peace in the 
world (Leira et al. 2007:11-16). However, foreign policy as identity politics implies a 
need for visibility, both domestically and abroad.  Touval and Zartman observe that 
“small and medium-sized powers may also wish to enhance their influence and 
prestige through mediation,” (2001:430).  For Norway, experience as a peace 
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mediator translates into international credibility as a state at the forefront of 
humanitarian affairs.  As Joseph Nye explains, “the posture of peacemaker identifies 
Norway with values shared by other nations that enhance Norway’s soft power,” 
(Nye 2004:10).  This is not to say that Norway engages in peace diplomacy for 
cynical reasons.  In fact, Norway may well have failed to anticipate the international 
ripple effects of the Oslo peace process for the Middle East.2   However, conflict 
mediation is now recognized abroad as a core element of Norwegian public 
diplomacy (Nye 2004, 112).  The Norwegian “self-image” has become its 
international identity as well.3   
As this discussion suggests, peace mediation serves a variety of interests within 
society; thus, the broad base of domestic support derives from both instrumental and 
normative sources.  In fact, in addition to the soft power and the missionary impulse 
rationales, Riste maintains that peace mediation may also serve to deflect attention 
from the more divisive foreign policy issues of EU and NATO membership (Riste 
2005:285).  Peace mediation is a non-controversial foreign policy for small states; the 
costs are negligible and the consequences of failure relatively mild.  Mediators may 
invite criticism if negotiations fail (especially within the domestic context), but 
success attracts international praise and media attention.  Moreover, Norway’s role as 
a peace mediator grants officials in the Foreign Ministry access to top officials in the 
US State Department and in the European Union (Matlary 2002:61-65). 
The current president of the Norwegian parliament, Thorbjørn Jagland, cautions 
against the tendency in Norwegian peace mediation towards going it alone (Jagland 3 
January 2008).  However, from a soft power perspective, multilateral initiatives dilute 
the potential for Norway to receive international recognition from a negotiated 
                                              
2 After I presented a case study of Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords for the Middle East, a member of the Foreign 
Ministry strongly objected to my insinuation that Norway sought a mediator role in order to enhance its international 
prestige, arguing that the outpouring of media attention took the Foreign Ministry by surprise (Bronebakk 15 February 
2007).  Regardless, the Foreign Ministry was well aware of this effect in subsequent peace processes (Egeland 22 October 
2007). 
3 Leira et al. (2007:15) argues that Norway is not viewed as a force for peace internationally. In a 2005 survey of citizens in 
eight European countries, humanitarian engagement was not once named in a write-in question about Norway’s positive 
characteristics.  However, I argue that a survey of foreign policymakers internationally would lead to quite different results. 
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agreement.  If peace mediation is seen as an access card into international politics, 
Norway will be less willing to insist on additional cooperation.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the overwhelming and immediate success of the Oslo Accords for the 
Middle East at the time of signing may have led to overconfidence in Norway’s skill 
as a peacemaker.  Determining whether this in fact occurred would require a research 
project in itself, but these two hypotheses may explain why Norway accepted the role 
as a sole mediator in subsequent peace processes, as in Sri Lanka. 
In sum, domestic sources of Norwegian peace mediation suggest a rather 
complex picture of causality that includes both normative and instrumental motives—
perhaps even for a single decision-maker.  However, do the sources of foreign policy 
impact the type of strategy used?  Although Princen argues for acknowledging a wide 
range of foreign policy objectives underlying mediator behavior, he fails to recognize 
that the diversity of motives may influence the strategy chosen.  For their part, 
Dobinson and Dale argue that Norwegian cultural values impact the mediation 
strategies used (2000:61). These cultural values, in turn, also inspire the decision to 
engage in mediation in the first place.  For example, Dobinson and Dale argue that 
Norwegian peacemaking efforts tend to favor avoiding conflict at all costs (2000:56), 
rather than attempting to build non-violent arenas for expressing legitimate 
grievances.  Thus, although Princen dismisses the motives of mediators with no 
material incentive in the conflict as irrelevant, Dobinson’s and Dale’s analysis 
suggests mediator motives may impact the strategy used and therefore, the 
effectiveness of mediation.   
Dobinson and Dale do not clearly state whether the impetus for a cultural 
approach to peacemaking derives from the Foreign Ministry and/or the NGOs 
involved.  However, I argue that unpacking each actor’s motives for mediation may 
suggest potential challenges and opportunities for cooperation.  Analogous to the 
Putnam (1988) model of two-level games, I expect to find evidence that the internal 
policymaking process among NGOs and the Foreign Ministry leaves a domestic 
imprint on the actual mediation process.  Even the interests of neutral mediators 
matter. 
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2.2 Small State-NGO Peace Mediation and the Conflict 
Cycle 
Whereas the previous section examined the domestic sources of foreign policy, 
this section outlines a model for foreign policy implementation.  Research on 
specifically NGO-state cooperation in peace mediation is scarce and consists mainly 
of single case studies of specific mediation efforts.  Exponential growth in non-
traditional mediation over the last few decades warrants greater attention from 
international relations scholars. The efforts of NGOs such as the International 
Committee for the Red Cross and the Quakers, international and regional 
governmental organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and a variety of 
independent individuals or “special envoys” with quasi-official legitimacy 
increasingly complement the diplomatic roles traditionally filled by states, and in 
some cases, replace states entirely (Crocker et al. 2001:498). This development owes 
to a variety of factors, including the global proliferation of NGOs, the increase in 
international governmental organizational (IGO) activity following the end of the 
Cold War, and an emerging norm in favor of intervention in domestic conflicts for 
humanitarian purposes (Crocker et al. 2001:498-499).   
Unfortunately, few scholars have addressed the theoretical challenge posed by 
non-traditional mediation.  One notable exception is the work of Chester Crocker, 
Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a 
Complex World.  In this volume, Crocker et al. (1999) attempt to synthesize a series 
of single case studies into a general analysis of multiparty mediation.  The authors 
propose a theoretical framework for understanding multiparty mediation as a 
“synthesis” of “structural” and “social-psychological” paradigms (Crocker et al. 
1999:24).  Their framework links mediation strategy to the concept of a conflict “life 
cycle,” (Crocker et al. 1999:26).  That is, the utility of each type of actor depends on 
the current phase of the conflict cycle.  The roles of the various mediators may thus 
shift over time in response to the needs of the conflict.  Inherent in this model is the 
assumption that regardless of their causes, all conflicts follow a certain pattern.  As 
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described by Crocker et al., the table below outlines the different stages of the 
conflict cycle. 
 
Crocker et al. advocate exploiting the “comparative advantage” of different 
mediators according to the needs of each particular conflict phase (1999:26-29). In 
the early phases of the conflict, when fighting is still relatively contained, the 
potential for third-party mediators to enter the conflict is relatively high, while their 
chances for success are relatively low (Ibid).  At this point, NGOs are more likely to 
take an interest in mediation, while state actors avoid wading into a conflict that has 
not yet deteriorated into full-scale war.  Simultaneously, the parties to the conflict are 
still relatively optimistic about their ability to win concessions on the battleground 
and are thus, less willing to compromise at the negotiation table (Ibid. 29-31).  As the 
conflict escalates, the potential for a settlement increases, while the opportunities for 
mediator involvement decline.  Positions harden, raising the stakes of submitting to 
negotiation. However, as the conflict reaches a hurting stalemate, the prospect of 
achieving a military victory fade and a negotiated settlement appears ever more 
attractive (Ibid.) 
Given this understanding of the conflict cycle, Crocker et al. argue that 
“…multiparty mediation can help to prevent the escalation of stakes by creating a set 
of parallel tracks for informal dialogue and communication,” (Crocker et al. 
1999:668).  They advocate NGO intervention at the early stages, when dialogue alone 
may succeed in averting an escalation of the conflict by settling grievances and 
                                              
4 Crocker et al. (1999:26).  
Table 2.2.1 Conflict Cycle Framework4  
Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
• “Rising tensions 
between or among 
parties” 
• “Confrontation”  
 
• “Outbreak of 
violence” 
• “Escalation of 
military hostilities 
• “Ceasefire” 
• “Formal settlement” 
• “Rapprochement and eventual reconciliation” 
• Possibly, “doubling back into violence” 
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warning of the consequences of continued violence for each side (Crocker et al. 
1999:30).  NGOs can also be effective in the middle phase by: 
…Establish[ing] informal channels of communication without compromising the 
interests of the parties or formally committing them to a politically risky course of 
action (Crocker et al. 1999:31). 
As the conflict reaches its apex, state mediators may be called upon to exert 
pressure on the parties to submit to negotiations, while NGOs and “small powers” 
can pursue pre-negotiations and/or track II negotiations to support the official process 
(Ibid).  The official process may also require the muscle and legitimacy of regional 
organizations in order to ratify and implement an eventual agreement (Ibid. 32-33).  
Lastly, in the implementation stages, the efforts of all earlier mediators can assist in 
pursuing peace-building measures at the official and grassroots levels (Ibid).   
The theoretical framework of Crocker et al. (1999) provides a contrast to the 
argument that mediators should enter a conflict only when it is “ripe” (or “ready”) for 
mediation.5  Rather, Crocker et al. (1999) advocate coordinating multiparty mediation 
to allow for different types of intervention throughout the conflict cycle.  Crocker et 
al. acknowledge that small states, international and regional organizations may all 
potentially take the lead as mediators, but that great powers are more likely to do so 
(Ibid. 32).  The authors maintain that while small states and NGOs may be able to 
facilitate negotiations during high levels of conflict through a track II channel, 
implementation of an eventual agreement will “require concerted engagement and 
follow-up by states or groups of states,” (Crocker et al. 1999:31).   
So, what then are the comparative advantages of small states and NGOs? In 
general, the literature on small states in international relations is relatively thin.6  
Specifically within the field of mediation theory, the role of small states has received 
more attention, but as Princen notes: “before the twentieth century, only states 
                                              
5 For examples, see Bercovitch (1997), Pruitt (1997) and Zartman (1997). 
6 Neumann and Gstohl cite four main reasons for this deficiency: US dominance in IR scholarship, a focus on the “major 
issues” of IR in which small states play at best a supporting role, the tendency for small state scholars to write in their 
national languages and the emphasis on large-scale empirical outcomes, in which small states exert less influence (2004:18-
19). 
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intervened as mediators and only powerful states at that,” (1992:6).  According to 
Princen, as mediators, small states are more likely than great powers to “elicit 
information relatively easily” from the parties, due to their perceived neutrality 
(1992:43).  Princen argues that a neutral mediator may “change the tenor of the 
negotiations” to allow for integrative, rather than distributive, bargaining (1992:44). 
In Impotent Superpower- Potent Small State, Jan Egeland proposes a theory for 
how small states can succeed in peace diplomacy where their superpower 
counterparts fail (Egeland 1988:175).7  Egeland bases his theory on a comparison of 
Norway and the United States; nevertheless, the analysis may apply to small states 
and superpowers more generally.  For example, in comparison to US foreign policy, 
Norway’s strategic interests are less likely to conflict with human rights goals 
(Egeland 1988:175). Norway also has “less complicated foreign policy objectives and 
less organizational tension” (Egeland 1988:5).  Historical factors also play a role, 
namely, Norway’s lack of a colonial past, support for decolonization and record of 
generous foreign aid (Egeland 1988:5).  Norway’s bureaucratic structure also differs 
significantly from that of the US in that the Foreign Ministry remains relatively 
insulated from the turf battles that plague the US State Department, Congress, and the 
Pentagon (Egeland 1988:27).  The Norwegian Foreign Ministry operates with a level 
of autonomy commensurate to allow for long-term policy implementation, regardless 
of the election cycles (Egeland 1988:173-174).  In short, through a confluence of 
historical factors and institutional structure, Norway is both willing and able to serve 
as a mediator in conflicts with only a minimal chance of success.  His argument 
concerns both Norway’s opportunities for serving as a mediator (less strategic 
tension, continuity in foreign policy, etc.) and its effectiveness in doing so (no history 
of decolonization, generous foreign aid, local knowledge). 
                                              
7 This work is particularly relevant given that Egeland served as Secretary of State for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1990 to 1997, that is, throughout the peace process and signing of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East as well as 
the peace process for Guatemala.  Egeland is widely credited with establishing a more activist foreign policy for the 
Norwegian state.  His experience as director of the Norwegian Red Cross and as chairman of Amnesty International in 
Norway provides a clear example of the close connection between Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government. 
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While Egeland’s argument focuses mainly on the advantages of the state, in 
terms of the political process, the advantages of NGOs as mediators include their role 
in building up civil society, their legitimacy at the local level and their vast 
knowledge base about the conflict region.  States in the midst of civil war typically 
lack a vibrant civil society, whether due to long-term state intimidation, ethnic 
fractionalization, or simply the resource demands of ongoing war.  As mediators, 
states are constrained in reaching out to these fragile institutions through both norms 
of non-intervention and mutual suspicion.  NGOs with local knowledge are, however, 
able to build networks of trust even within societies in conflict.  NGO personnel are 
also able to provide advice on specific cultural and historical context of the conflict 
due to their often long-term presence in the region. 
Based on the Crocker, Hampson and Aall theoretical framework and Egeland’s 
theory of small-state comparative advantages, I propose the following general 
framework for understanding how the “Norwegian model” operates within a 
mediation cycle framework.  The two frameworks—for the conflict cycle and the 
mediation cycle, respectively—are herein described as analytically separate entities.  
The extent to which these frameworks overlap remains an empirical question.8  
Within the mediation literature, proposed links between the two frameworks include 
the theory that a mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary premise for negotiations, 
for example.  However, determining the extent and nature of the links between the 
conflict cycle and the mediation cycle is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 2.2.2 on the following page outlines the expected traits of mediation for a 
given phase of the mediation cycle.  These statements should not be understood as 
specific hypotheses, but rather, as general characteristics of mediation based on a 
division of labor throughout the life cycle of the mediation attempt.  
 
 
                                              
8 I am indebted to Professor Arild Underdal for this suggestion. 
 19
Table 2.2.2 Mediation Cycle Framework for the “Norwegian Model” 
Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
• Norwegian NGOs with 
presence in  local region 
begin conflict resolution 
activities in addition to 
existing development 
projects 
• Parties to conflict accept 
Norwegian actors due to 
their lack of colonial 
past, lack of material 
interest in conflict and 
history of foreign aid to 
region. 
• No great powers 
currently show interest 
in mediating conflict 
themselves. 
 
• Norwegian Foreign Ministry begins 
cooperation with Norwegian NGOs on 
ground through financial support of 
Track II mediation 
• Norwegian Track II efforts begin to 
take on character of pre-negotiation.  
• Contacts made through local NGOs 
utilized to broach subject of Track I 
negotiations.  Norwegian actors 
guarantee secrecy of eventual 
negotiations and offer to hold them in 
Norway. 
• Track I negotiations begin and gain 
momentum.  A breakthrough in talks 
leads Norway to press for 
international and/or regional 
organization involvement. 
 
• Norway supports 
grassroots peace 
process, through which 
NGOs take lead. 
• Great powers, 
international and/or 
regional organizations 
heavily involved and 
commit to assisting with 
implementation 
• Norway pledges 
development aid tied to 
eventual peace 
agreement, but 
otherwise, moves into 
background of 
mediation efforts. 
 
The framework above represents a best case scenario in the sense that each 
phase progresses toward an eventual peace agreement.  The outcome of failure 
depends on the phase of the conflict in which negotiations break down.  In the “low 
intensity” phase, a breakdown in negotiations does not significantly change the 
situation on the ground.  The NGO(s) that lead the failed attempt may bow out, but 
one would expect additional NGOs to step forward with their own conflict resolution 
initiatives.  More likely, the initial NGO will continue peace initiatives despite 
successive failures, as long as financial support for its work remains available. 
If negotiations fail in the second phase, one of several outcomes may occur.  
First, negotiations may dissolve and the level of mediation reverts to the previous 
stage.  Second, a particularly bitter split may lead to resurgence in conflict intensity in 
which even continuing Track II negotiations becomes impossible.  In this case, 
conflict resolution efforts may grind to a halt.  Under the best case scenario, the 
parties may agree to resume negotiation at a later date.  Under the worst case 
scenario, the parties mobilize for war and set their hopes solely on achieving a 
military victory.   
In the declining phase, a failure to implement a negotiated agreement results in 
roughly one of four outcomes: (1) the terms of the peace treaty are violated, but war 
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does not resume, (2) an external monitor punishes violations of the agreement and 
forces its implementation, (3) the parties re-negotiate the terms of the agreement or 
(4) the parties return to the low intensity conflict phase.  In practice, combinations of 
these scenarios may also occur, such as partial external implementation and a 
resurgence of low-level violence.  
2.3 Strengths and Limitations of the “Norwegian Model” 
According to the conflict cycle framework, the level of Norwegian control over 
the direction of the peace process resembles a bell curve.  In the first phase, many 
small actors engage in conflict resolution initiatives and no clear peace process 
develops.  In the second phase, Norway assists the parties in serious talks and 
communicates directly with each side.  In the third phase, the parties themselves 
accept responsibility for implementation and additional third parties assist in 
monitoring and, in some cases, implementation of the agreement.  The irony of this 
model is that ensuring continued domestic support for peace mediation may require 
emphasizing the importance of the Norwegian role in the peace process following the 
signing of a negotiated agreement, when international and domestic media attention 
is at its peak.  This is also when Norwegian influence over the process approaches its 
ebb.   
Through the conflict cycle framework, the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of the “Norwegian model” identified in the introduction to this paper 
can be temporally located according to phases in the conflict.  These factors are 
reprinted in Table 2.3.1. The first advantage, deniability, concerns the extent to which 
negotiations offer the protection of secrecy to the actors involved.  Deniability is 
likely to be a main concern during the “rising/high” phases of the conflict, when 
engaging in negotiations may create a perception of weakness.  The parties are likely 
to require secrecy as a condition for beginning any kind of talks.  Deniability also 
refers to the Norwegian state’s ability to provide financial assistance to one or more 
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of the parties through the NGO.  This fig leaf may be necessary to avoid upsetting 
allies that might perceive such funding as support to terrorist organizations. 
The value of local knowledge, the 
second factor, enters into the “low 
intensity” phase, as Norwegian NGOs 
with a network of contacts and a history 
of development aid in the region begin 
grassroots efforts to avert conflict.  This 
local knowledge base remains an asset 
throughout the conflict cycle, as officials 
from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
rely on their NGO counterparts for 
advice and utilize their networks.  In addition, the NGOs also develop a level of trust 
within the afflicted community.  The NGOs’ legitimacy on the local level represents 
the third major advantage of the “Norwegian model.”  The Foreign Ministry employs 
the resources of the state, both to finance peace initiatives and to access political 
networks, but the NGO partners retain their status as “trusted mediators” in the local 
context.  This factor is likely to enter at all phases of the conflict cycle, but is of 
particular importance during the “rising/high” phase, when barriers to entry for 
mediators are exceedingly high. 
The final potential advantage of the “Norwegian model” is the potential for 
streamlined cooperation.  Through direct contacts and often informal personal 
networks, NGO representatives within the conflict region and officials from the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry coordinate their efforts to allow for the type of role 
shifting outlined in the framework above.  In contrast to multi-party mediation efforts 
elsewhere, this perhaps represents a primary strength of the “Norwegian model.”  
Close contacts between the NGOs and the Foreign Ministry may help to dampen any 
potential turf battles between the two.  In contrast, the multiplicity of mediation 
initiatives in Burundi during the 1990’s is cited as an example of the type of 
“fragmentation” that may occur in the absence of a central coordinating mechanism 
Table 2.3.1 Potential Strengths and Limitations of 
the “Norwegian Model” 
Strengths: 
1. Deniability 
2. Local knowledge 
3. Trusted mediators 
4. Streamlined cooperation 
Limitations: 
1. Democratic incompatibility 
2. Mutual aims critical 
3. Diplomats overnight 
4. Mediator without muscles 
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(Hara 1999:139).  Hara identifies no less than 35 separate mediators for the 
Burundian conflict in the 1990’s alone (1999:153-157).  The challenge is to 
coordinate the advantages of each actor in a complementary fashion.  Arguably, the 
“Norwegian model” represents an example of cooperation based on the principle of 
comparative advantage. 
The four potential disadvantages of the “Norwegian model” include three of a 
practical nature and one normative concern.  The latter relates to the democratic 
implications of state-NGO partnerships.  If the state cedes important foreign policy 
tasks to an NGO, does this weaken democratic control over Norwegian foreign 
affairs?  Is the secrecy necessary to enable negotiations acceptable from a democratic 
perspective?  These and related questions form a normative critique of the 
“Norwegian model,” which I will address in the comparative analysis following the 
case studies.   
A second criticism of the “Norwegian model” concerns the importance of 
mutual aims.  In practice, Norwegian NGOs and officials from the Foreign Ministry 
have managed to maintain a broad consensus on the strategy and aims of mediation.  
In part, this may reflect the closeness of Norwegian society.  Personal relationships 
among NGO leaders and officials from the Foreign Ministry are not at all uncommon, 
as would be expected in a country of approximately 4.5 million people.  In addition, 
as discussed in the review of Norwegian foreign policy, there exists a general 
ideological consensus on the importance of Norway’s role as a force for peace.  Even 
when differences of opinion do occur, a compromise solution often results.  For 
example, when the Foreign Ministry opposed Norwegian Church Aid’s plan for 
peace mediation in Mali, the Ministry provided money for development projects, but 
refrained from official involvement in the process (Sommerfeldt 30 March 2007).  
Nevertheless, ideological consensus on the aims and strategies of peace mediation 
should not be taken for granted.  Given that Foreign Ministry funds account for the 
majority of the “Big Five” organizations’ budgets, the NGOs are financially 
dependent on the goodwill of the Norwegian government.  Likewise, Norwegian 
NGOs in conflict regions are perceived as representatives of Norway.  Their tactics 
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on the ground thus, rightly or not, reflect on the foreign policy of the Norwegian 
government.   Consequently, the “Norwegian model” implies a situation of mutual 
dependence.  The model would cease to function without consensus among both 
NGOs and the government.   
A third practical concern relates to the lack of diplomatic training among NGO 
leaders.  This is both a strength and a weakness of NGOs; a strength, in the sense that 
their non-official status helps in building trust as mediators lacking a hidden agenda; 
a weakness, in that NGO representatives may be unprepared for the type of 
complicated diplomacy required for intractable conflicts.  Of course, the alternative 
view is that NGO diplomacy and official diplomacy can prove complementary.  
Regardless, NGO representatives do not receive the sort of formalized professional 
training required for diplomats; hence, one would expect that the quality of NGO 
mediation would be, if not less effective, at least more variable.   
Lastly, in terms of practical difficulties, the “Norwegian model” lacks the 
resources for enforcement of an eventual peace agreement.  Returning to the 
mediation cycle framework, in the “declining” phase, Norway will likely require the 
assistance of more powerful actors, such as great powers or regional and/or 
international organizations, in order to enforce and assist in the implementation of a 
peace agreement.  Both the Norwegian state and their NGO counterparts are 
“mediators without muscles.”  Compiled together, these four potential disadvantages 
form a powerful counterargument against misplaced optimism over the effectiveness 
of the “Norwegian model.”  I will return to this critique in the comparative analysis 
chapter and comment on its salience in light of the case studies. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Qualitative Case Study 
The following analysis consists of a series of three case studies of the 
“Norwegian model.”  According to Bennett: “a case study is… the investigation of a 
well-defined aspect of a historical happening” (2004:21), in this instance: Norwegian 
state-NGO cooperation in peace mediation.  The nature of the research question 
determines the method chosen; that is, what is the “Norwegian model” and what are 
its strengths and limitations?  In order to organize the analysis, the previous section 
presented a theoretical framework based on the concept of a mediation cycle 
involving multiple third party actors.  Accordingly, the theoretical framework 
includes both the individual elements of mediation and the temporal sequence in 
which these occur.   
 In the cases studies to follow, I apply the model of multiparty mediation listed 
in Table 2.2.2 on page 19 to three cases of Norwegian peace mediation in civil 
conflicts.   Each case is organized according to the three mediation cycle phases and 
deviations from the theoretical model are reported.  I conclude each case by 
comparing its relative fit of the theoretical model.  In the comparative analysis 
chapter following the case studies, I assess the implications of the case study results 
for mediation effectiveness according to the potential strengths and weaknesses of 
Norwegian peace mediation listed in Table 2.3.1 on page 21.   
The case study methodology used consists of a combination of process tracing 
techniques and controlled comparison.  The former describes the method of 
examining the rationale provided for policy choices, the timing of policy decisions, 
and finally, comparing these two factors to what the proposed model would predict.  
Van Evera defines process tracing as: 
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The tracing of a causal process by which initial conditions are translated into 
outcomes… [This] includes the tracing of both decision processes and causal 
processes that do not involve decisions (Van Evera 1997:52).   
Conclusions drawn from process tracing constitute a “strong test of theory,” as 
the “predictions are often unique” to the case(s) studied (Van Evera 1997:65). 
Conversely, with input-output models of behavior, cases that appear similar may 
simply exhibit “illusory commonality,” meaning that two or more observations share 
similar values by coincidence and not due to a shared underlying causal mechanism 
(Ragin 1987:48).  Likewise, two observations may differ significantly in value, but 
nevertheless result from the same causal mechanism (Ibid).   
However, the main drawback of a process tracing approach is that the uniqueness 
of the theory also limits its applicability to other cases.  While the conclusions of the 
analysis should result in high content validity for the Norwegian case, this comes at 
the sacrifice of parsimonious theory.  Further research is required to establish 
conclusions for small states as a whole, for example.  Likewise, case studies do not 
identify the theory’s antecedent conditions (Van Evera 1997:71).  We cannot be sure 
whether the causal mechanisms identified owe to a unique antecedent condition in the 
Norwegian case or that the conclusions hold generally. 
The case study analysis to follow also includes techniques of controlled 
comparison. I compare the three cases along several variable dimensions, in 
accordance with the temporal framework presented in the previous chapter.  These 
variables comprise elements of whole cases and thus, “should be understood in 
relation to each other,” rather than as isolated characteristics (Ragin 1987:52).  I 
understand each variable as a step in the mediation process, undoubtedly conditioned 
by previous policy choices and situational constraints.  This type of controlled 
comparison of general characteristics corresponds to George’s definition of a 
“disciplined –configurative case study,” (George 1979:51).  Roughly speaking, the 
cases consist of two types of independent variables: process and contextual, while the 
dependent variables refer to the outcome of mediation in a broad sense.  However, in 
order to go beyond a correlative model of causation, I examine the statements of 
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actors involved in each process, through interviews and written accounts.  From an 
epistemological perspective, the variables of this study differ significantly from an 
experiment in the natural sciences.  Each variable contains an element of human 
agency and as such, understanding the motives for behaviour requires abandoning an 
instrumentally rational view of human action.  The statements of the actors involved, 
while subject to bias and lapses in memory, nevertheless establish a more complete 
model of causality than assumptions of instrumental rationality would permit. 
 Table 3.3.1 below identifies the independent and dependent variables in a 
general sense.  As the table illustrates, the case studies to follow consist of a 
controlled comparison to the extent that each analysis proceeds according to a single 
defined set of variables.  However, the study also employs process tracing techniques 
to evaluate the mediation attempt from beginning to end, through a series of 
intervening variables. 
Table 3.3.1 Variables 
 Independent Dependent 
Conflict Cycle 
Phase 
Contextual Process Outcome 
Low Background 
characteristics of conflict 
Norwegian NGO and/or 
state involvement 
Initiation of mediation or return to 
continuation of conflict with no 
significant change 
Rising/High Status of conflict, 
involvement of other 
third-parties  
Type of mediation, 
cooperation among state 
and NGO(s) 
Signing of peace agreement, 
continued fighting and/or initiation 
of new mediation track 
Declining Terms of settlement, 
assistance of additional 
third parties 
Role of Norwegian state 
and/or NGO(s) in 
implementation 
Full implementation of agreement, 
partial implementation, or no 
implementation 
3.2 Case Selection 
The analysis is limited to mediation of internal conflicts in the post-Cold War 
period involving Norwegian state-NGO cooperation: the Israeli-Palestinian, 
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Guatemala, and Sudan peace processes, respectively.  These cases also include a non-
state actor as one of the parties to the conflict.  All three peace processes are 
representative cases in that they are readily identified with the “Norwegian model” 
and occurred during roughly the same time period.  Each case thus fits the conditions 
for the framework for multi-party mediation based on the conflict cycle: “they are 
units within which the process entailed by the hypothesis can take place,” (King et al. 
1994:221).  Significant variation in the independent variables helps to minimize the 
role of certain background characteristics to the conflict.  For example, the choice of 
three different continents should minimize the role of geographic context in 
generalizing about the interactive model of peace mediation.  The role and 
importance of religion to the conflict, as well as the involvement of additional third 
party actors, also varied significantly across the cases studied.  Nevertheless, the three 
peace processes are most likely linked.  In statistical terms, we should expect 
significant autocorrelation among the three cases.  The Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
in particular can hardly be expected to approach each instance of mediation without 
any reference to the others.  Hence, the three cases cannot be considered completely 
independent from one another, and the conclusions of the analysis are necessarily 
modest as evidence of a more general phenomenon among small states (King et al. 
1994: 222).   
At a minimum, competing policy demands require a coherent and consistent 
approach to mediation engagements occurring over the same time span.  In other 
words, I expect policymakers (including NGOs) will maintain a relatively stable set 
of priorities, changing course dramatically only in response to external events.  At a 
maximum, I expect to find evidence of learning, as policymakers adapt their 
strategies based on previous results.  The latter hypothesis requires a more thorough 
research strategy, but the temporal sequencing of policy changes provides at least 
some clue, as do the statements of policymakers at the time.   
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3.3 Data 
The interviews were conducted over a roughly one-year period, from 2007 to 
2008.  Subjects were chosen for their familiarity and experience with Norwegian 
peace mediation, as well as their availability during the research process.  The 
structure of the interviews was relatively open-ended and the majority occurred 
before the theoretical framework had been fully developed.  As King, Keohane and 
Verba observe, “data has a way of disciplining thought,” (1994:13).  Likewise, I 
found some of the most interesting avenues of research through an inductive analysis 
of the interview transcripts.  Prior to each interview, I conducted a search on the 
newspaper database “Retriever” for any Norwegian newspaper articles on the 
interview subject since approximately 1990.9  I then noted a series of questions based 
on each interviewee’s role in the various peace processes and jotted down topics I 
intended to address (i.e. how state-NGO cooperation initially began).   
During the interviews, questions were modified based on the conversation, 
while ensuring that I also addressed the questions and issues noted beforehand.  This 
relatively flexible method was intended to ensure that relevant information did not go 
unnoticed, even if I had not anticipated broaching certain subjects during my 
preparation. According to Rubin and Rubin: “qualitative interviewing design is 
flexible, iterative, and continuous,” (2004:43).  The questioning was designed to fit 
the expertise of the interviewee, concentrating on first-person narratives of the events 
in question.  The lines of questioning began relatively open-ended.  For example, I 
opened every interview by asking, “How did you first become involved in X peace 
process?”  In this way, my intention was to encourage the interviewees to share their 
experiences as they perceived them.  I closed each interview by asking the 
interviewee if he/she could think of anything important to the topic that I had not 
asked about.  The majority of the interviews were taped and transcripts are available 
upon request.  For those that were not recorded, detailed notes are available. 
                                              
9 For the interview with Paul Wee, I conducted a Google search for background information.   
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Several of the main research institutes compiled reports on the various peace 
processes, often at the behest of the Foreign Ministry.  These provide valuable 
information on the extent to which the implementation of mediation policy met the 
goals of the Foreign Ministry, and often include a lengthy background discussion of 
the conflict. I also refer to Norwegian newspaper articles written throughout the cases 
analyzed, as well as Foreign Ministry press releases.  The cases also draw 
information from first-person accounts of the peace processes, particularly in the 
Middle East case. 
The secondary literature used consists of scholarly journal articles and books 
written on the three peace processes analyzed here.  The first case, on the Oslo peace 
process for the Middle East, employs the lion’s share of the secondary literature 
included in this paper.  This owes to the overwhelming academic attention this peace 
process received in relation to the two latter cases.  Nevertheless, the cases on 
Guatemala and Sudan also include secondary literature, primarily to provide 
background on the cases and to situate Norway’s contribution in the context of the 
peace processes as a whole.   
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4. Cases 
 The cases that follow are organized in chronological order, according to the 
signing of a negotiated agreement. Although the Guatemala peace process began in 
1990, prior to the initiation of the Oslo back channel (in January 1993), the latter 
resulted in an agreement first and cemented Norway’s international position as a 
peacemaker.  Accordingly, accounts of the Guatemala process often suggest the 
shadow of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East.  For this reason, I place the Middle 
East case first.  The main period of Norwegian involvement in the IGAD peace 
process for Sudan began in 1998 and resulted in a signed peace agreement in January 
2005.     
4.1 The Oslo Process for the Middle East 
4.1.1 Low 
The background characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict are well documented 
and will hence receive only brief mention here.  The substance of the conflict 
concerns conflicting claims to the territory of present-day Israel and to the degree of 
autonomy granted to the Palestinian inhabitants of Israeli-occupied territory.  
Palestinians and Israelis are particularly divided on the status of Palestinian refugees 
who demand to return to their former homes in Israel and to the control of Jerusalem, 
home to Islamic, Jewish and Christian holy sites.   
In 1991, the US organized a multilateral peace conference in Madrid, with 
representation from Israel, several of the Arab states and the major global actors, 
including Russia, Japan and the EU.  At this time, Israel maintained control over the 
Gaza strip and the West Bank, both of which were occupied primarily by 
Palestinians, with scattered clusters of Israeli settlements.  Israel justified control of 
these regions as a security interest, to protect Israeli settlers and to prevent terrorist 
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attacks emanating from Gaza and the West Bank.  The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) served as the de facto political leadership for the Palestinian 
population.  Given the absence of Palestinian self-rule in Israel and in Israeli-
occupied territories, the PLO maintained its headquarters in exile, in Tunis. 
The PLO clearly entered negotiations as the weaker party.  The fall of the Soviet 
Union removed one of the PLO’s key supporters, and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat’s 
support of Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War strained the PLO’s relationship 
with the United States and led the Gulf States to cut off much needed financial 
support (Qurie 2006:34-35; Tveit 2005: 406-407; Zartman 1997:196).  According to 
then-US Secretary of State James Baker: “in the wake of the Gulf War, the PLO 
stood close to collapse,” (Baker 1999:186).  At the same time, Hamas continued to 
gain strength within Palestinian society, threatening the political dominance of 
Arafat’s ruling party, Fatah. 
Israel entered multilateral negotiations under pressure from the Bush I 
administration, which threatened to withdraw financial support (Tveit 2005:330; 
Zartman 1997:197); Israel’s commitment to the negotiations was correspondingly 
weak.  In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir of the conservative Likud party 
admitted retrospectively that Israel’s participation in the Madrid conference was only 
an act (Tveit 2005:353).  The Israeli government strongly objected to any type of UN 
involvement (Baker 1999:194; Tveit 2005:326).  Shamir also refused to allow official 
representation from the PLO in Madrid (Baker 1999:188-191).  At the time, Israeli 
law forbade direct contact with members of the PLO (Waage 2000:80).  The Israeli 
government feared that direct negotiations would grant the PLO status as a legitimate 
political actor.  However, in a compromise, Israel agreed to allow Palestinians to 
attend the conference as members of the Jordanian delegation—in effect, attempting 
to negotiate with Palestinians while circumventing the PLO (Beilin 1995:25).  
Nevertheless, once negotiations began, it soon became clear that the Palestinian 
delegates received their instructions directly from Arafat, who ensured they would 
stall the negotiating process until the PLO received official recognition as the 
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representative of the Palestinian people (Waage 2004:54; Tveit 2005:288, 345).  
Given the motivations of each side, the Madrid peace process quickly ground to a 
halt. 
In the June 1992 elections, the Israeli Labour party defeated Likud, and Yitzhak 
Rabin replaced Shamir as Prime Minister.  Shimon Peres, a rival of Rabin’s who was 
seen as more amenable to peace, was named Foreign Minister (Corbin 1994:26).  The 
new Israeli Labour government realized that without an agreement, the PLO might be 
forced to cede control to Hamas—a group which posed a far greater threat to Israel 
than the PLO ever had (Tveit 2005:289; Zartman 1997:197).  Thus, while both Israel 
and the PLO stalled in the official negotiations, each side recognized a window of 
opportunity was closing. 
 The Oslo channel began against this backdrop, with the initial goal of breaking 
the stalemate in the official negotiations (Waage 2000:78-79).  However, Norwegian 
involvement in the Middle East peace process began long before 1993 (Egeland et al. 
1994:8).  Norway enjoyed a special relationship with Israel since the latter state’s 
founding in 1948.  The Norwegian Labor party in particular maintained close ties to 
its sister party in Israel (Egeland 2007:224; Waage 2000: 25, 32, 47-48).  As former 
Norwegian Labor party chairman Haakon Lie stated, “When Israel asked for 
something, we never asked questions.  We did as we were asked,”10 (Tveit 2005:34).  
In fact, Norway sold heavy water to Israel in 1959 with the verbal promise that it 
would be used only “for peaceful purposes” (Bondevik 2006:253; Tveit 2005:207, 
251; Waage 2000:32).   
Norway’s uncritical support first began to wane following Israel’s 
overwhelming victory in the Six Day War of 1967, but the real turning point occurred 
during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon (Stoltenberg 2001: 261-262; Waage 
2000:36, 42).  Norwegian soldiers served in the UN peacekeeping force for Lebanon 
                                              
10 “Når Israel ba om noe, stilte vi aldri spørsmål. Vi gjorde det de ba om,” Håkon Lie in Tveit (2005:34). 
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(UNIFIL) and witnessed the pre-emptive Israeli invasion of Beirut firsthand.  
Norwegian humanitarian NGOs also attended to the wounded civilians in Lebanon, 
including the Palestinian refugees.   Their efforts also enhanced Norway’s standing 
within Palestinian society (Waage 2000:44-45). 
In 1978, PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat established contact with the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Beirut, Hans Wilhelm Longva (Waage 2000:51, Tveit 2005:25).  Two 
years later, Arafat told Longva that he understood the Norwegian public strongly 
supported Israel, but that he hoped Norway would one day help the PLO negotiate 
with Israel through secret diplomacy (Stoltenberg 2001:264; Tveit 2005:35).  Arafat 
sought out Norway as a country with close ties to both Israel and the United States 
(Waage 2000:51). Throughout the 1980’s, then-Norwegian Foreign Minister, 
Thorvald Stoltenberg repeatedly expressed to both sides his willingness to host peace 
negotiations on Norwegian soil, often at Arafat’s behest (Stoltenberg 2001:264-268; 
Tveit 2005:173; Waage 2000:63,66).  However, Israel continued to reject any 
suggestion of negotiating directly with the PLO (Ibid.).  Thus, the groundwork for 
Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process began long before 1993, 
through the work of, among others, Longva and Stoltenberg in the Foreign Ministry 
and the humanitarian aid efforts of various Norwegian NGOs. 
In 1989, then-Norwegian Foreign Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik agreed to 
provide government finding for a comprehensive study of the living conditions of 
Palestinians in Gaza, to be conducted by the social science research institute Fafo 
(Waage 2000:68-69).  Fafo’s founder, Terje Rød-Larsen was living in Cairo at the 
time, while his wife, Mona Juul, served as a diplomat for the Norwegian Embassy in 
Egypt (Corbin 1994:12).  While in Cairo, Rød-Larsen established a friendship with 
the brother of the PLO Chairman, Fathi Arafat, and it was Fathi who suggested the 
concept for the Gaza survey (Tveit 2005:290).  The idea was controversial within the 
Foreign Ministry. Fafo had earlier been involved in a financially disastrous 
development project in Northern Norway, which also revealed suspicious ties to a 
Russian parliamentarian (Egeland 2007:227-228).  Nevertheless, Bondevik signed off 
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on the project.  Marianne Heiberg, a Middle East researcher from the Nowegian 
Institute for International Politics (NUPI), was hired to help lead the research study.  
Heiberg was also the wife of then-Minister of Defense Johan Jørgen Holst. 
Beginning in the late 1980’s, Sweden assisted the PLO in establishing contact 
with the US (Egeland 22 October 2007; Tveit 2005: 275; Waage 2000:56). However, 
Sweden lacked the type of close relationship to Israel that Norway enjoyed and in 
1992, Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson suggested the PLO contact his good 
friend Thorvald Stoltenberg about seeking Norwegian assistance (Egeland 22 
October 2007; Egeland 2007:225).  Soon after, the PLO’s finance minister, Abu Ala 
(Ahmed Qurie), visited Oslo to request Norwegian aid for the PLO from State 
Secretary Jan Egeland (Qurie 2006:37; Tveit 2005:346).  Although Egeland could not 
grant the request, he and Mona Juul (who was also present) were impressed by Ala 
(Waage 2000:70).  Juul introduced Ala to her husband, Terje Rød-Larsen, and 
obtained Ala’s assurances of full support for Fafo’s research on the living conditions 
of Palestinians in Gaza (Ibid.).   
Rød-Larsen also met Yossi Beilin in 1992.  Beilin was a young and promising 
politician in the Israeli Labor party and enjoyed a close relationship to Shimon Peres 
(Ibid. 72).  The two men discussed the ongoing Madrid peace process and Rød-
Larsen suggested holding secret peace talks between Israel and the PLO in Norway. 
Beilin was warm to the idea, but was not in a position to influence Shamir (Beilin 
1999:52; Tveit 2005:349).  Following the election of Rabin, Beilin was named 
Deputy Secretary of State, and in September 1992, Egeland, Juul and Rød-Larsen 
formally invited the Israelis to participate in secret negotiations with the PLO (Waage 
2000:78).  Beilin could not attend himself, given Rabin’s likely opposition (Beilin 
1999:62).  However, Beilin suggested to Egeland that his friend Yair Hirschfeld 
attend the meeting in Oslo (Egeland 2007:229).  On the Palestinian side, Abu Ala 
accepted the invitation to Oslo, with the consent of Arafat. 
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4.1.2 Rising/High 
The first Oslo peace talks were held in January 1993 at Borregaard, a Sarpsborg 
mansion owned by the CEO of Orkla, who was a close friend of Rød-Larsen’s (Tveit 
2005:373).  From the beginning, only Jan Egeland, Mona Juul and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg from the Foreign Ministry were aware of the secret talks, in addition to 
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (Waage 2004:64, 83).  Egeland also kept the 
US State Department regularly informed of the talks, knowing that American support 
was crucial to the implementation of any eventual settlement (Egeland 2007:229-
230).  The Americans did not object provided the back channel supported the official 
multilateral peace process.   
Two Israeli academics attended the meeting in Sarpsborg: Yair Hirschfeld and 
Ron Pundak.  PLO finance minister Abu Ala and Abu Mazen’s (Mahmoud Abbas’) 
advisor Hassan Asfour represented the Palestinians, along with Maher al Kurd, their 
interpreter.  Neither side could be sure of the other’s official status.  Arafat stood 
behind the channel from the beginning (Qurie 2006:51) and the Palestinians assumed 
Peres supported the two Israeli academics.  In truth, Israeli Deputy State Secretary 
Beilin kept the first meeting secret from Peres, in order to maintain deniability (Tveit 
2005:376).  Fafo served as the official cover for the Oslo talks: Ron Pundak and Yair 
Hirschfield were listed on Fafo’s payroll and the Foreign Ministry paid Fafo’s 
internal costs, with Egeland’s approval (Egeland 2007:239; Tveit 2005:373).11  
At the start of the first meeting, Marianne Heiberg presented the results of 
Fafo’s survey of the living conditions of Palestinians in Gaza, in line with the 
research seminar cover.  Heiberg herself was unaware of the true nature of the 
meeting at this time (Tveit 2005:385).  When the actual negotiations began, Juul, 
Larsen and Egeland operated within a strictly facilitative role, handling the logistics 
of the meetings and building personal relationships with the representatives during 
                                              
11 The entire channel cost the Foreign Ministry five million Norwegian kroner (roughly one million US dollars).  The 
Ministry’s financial department accepted the requests without comment, but more detailed financial reporting would have 
been required had negotiations lasted much longer (Egeland 2007:239-240). 
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coffee breaks and meals (Tveit 2005:375; Waage 2004:80-83).  The Norwegian 
actors sought to maintain a “discrete distance” from the negotiations (Tveit 
2005:379).  Within the Foreign Ministry, the idea of allowing Rød-Larsen, as Fafo’s 
director, to lead peace facilitation was not uncontroversial, given Fafo’s 
mismanagement of earlier projects, as mentioned above (Egeland 2007:227-228).  
Moreover, Rød-Larsen had “never been a part of or trained by the ministry of foreign 
affairs,” (Waage 2004:62).  However, he had developed a network of contacts within 
the Foreign Ministry and within the Labor party more generally, not the least of 
which through his wife, Mona Juul.  
During the course of the first two meetings, the parties reached an agreement on 
a declaration of principles (known as the Sarpsborg DoP) for a peace process: Israeli 
forces would end the occupation in Gaza and grant the Palestinians a foothold in the 
West Bank, most likely in Jericho.  The exact nature of Palestinian self-rule was 
ambiguous, but the emerging agreement would give the Israelis an exit strategy for 
Gaza and allow the Palestinians some degree of territorial control.  Beilin upgraded 
the channel after the second meeting by contacting Peres, who then informed Rabin 
(Beilin 1999:71-73).  Unbeknownst to Peres and Beilin, Rabin had already received 
word of the channel through Israeli intelligence and contacted US Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher to tell him that Israel did not take the Oslo channel seriously 
(Tveit 2005:380-381).  As a result, the US largely disregarded the back channel as 
well.  After all, the Oslo channel was only one of several informal channels at the 
time (Qurie 2006:85).  In addition to its contacts in the United States, Israel also 
informed Egypt about the channel sporadically (Savir 1998:42). 
After the third meeting, PLO foreign minister Abu Mazen informed Egypt, 
Tunisia and Morocco about the Oslo channel (Tveit 2005:381). The PLO also 
demanded Israel upgrade its representation beyond the two academics.  However, in 
April 1993, Johan Jørgen Holst replaced Thorvald Stoltenberg as Foreign Minister 
when the latter accepted a position as the UN mediator for the former Yugoslavia.  As 
Defense Minister, Holst built a network of contacts in the Middle East, and had in 
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fact already met Arafat, Rabin and Peres (Egeland et al. 1994:8; Tveit 2005:35, 221-
222). Holst had a reputation within the Israeli Labor party as “arrogant” for his direct 
criticism of Israel during the war in Lebanon (Tveit 2005:214).  Arafat was pleased to 
hear of Holst’s appointment and considered him sympathetic to the Palestinian cause 
(Ibid.383).   
Holst enjoyed a good relationship with Rød-Larsen, through cooperation with a 
peace project in Sudan three years earlier (Ibid. 384).  However, the new Foreign 
Minister was less generous to Egeland, pushing the latter to the side in the Oslo talks.  
Egeland accepted a position as Stoltenberg’s assistant in May, partly out of 
frustration with Holst, who unsuccessfully sought to have Rød-Larsen replace 
Egeland as State Secretary  (Ibid.389).  In May 1993, Holst surprised the delegates by 
taking an active role in the fifth round of negotiations, which was held while the 
Foreign Ministry hosted an official conference on Palestinian refugee issues (Beilin 
1999:84; Qurie 2006:138).  Holst began communicating directly with each side by 
phone and through letters; within the Oslo meetings, he did not hesitate to formulate 
potential points of compromise (Tveit 2005:390, 398; Waage 2004:107).   
In late May 1993, Israel officially upgraded the channel by sending Uri Savir, 
the press attaché for the Israeli consulate in New York (Beilin 1999:85; Tveit 
2005:393-394).  Holst’s personal engagement in the process may have helped prod 
the Israelis into this decision; with the Norwegian Foreign Minister involved, Israel 
needed official representation as well (Waage 2004:108).  In his own account of the 
Oslo channel, Savir praises the Norwegians, and Rød-Larsen especially, for creating 
a relaxed atmosphere for negotiations—the “Oslo spirit,” (Savir 1998:11).  The Oslo 
setting lacked the formalities of traditional diplomatic protocol and the secrecy of the 
talks eliminated the incentive to play for the domestic audience (Egeland 2007:245-
246).  Directly prior to the meeting, a Norwegian reporter contacted Egeland about 
rumors that the PLO and Israeli government were meeting secretly in Oslo (Ibid. 
235).  Egeland responded by suggesting the rumor must be a reference to the official 
conference on refugee issues. It was clear to Egeland that the leak came from the US 
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State Department.  Accordingly, the parties urged Egeland to quit using the secure 
phone from the US Embassy and to limit the flow of information to the Americans 
about the channel (Egeland 2007:235).  For the Israelis, keeping the US in the dark 
served to pre-empt criticism that Israel favored the Oslo channel over the official 
Madrid process and allowed Israel to negotiate a deal with the Palestinians without 
the threat of US pressure (Tveit 2005:419-420).  The Palestinians, on the other hand, 
actively sought out US involvement, but news of direct negotiations with Israel posed 
a substantial security threat to the actors involved and would have led to a political 
debacle for the PLO. 
The Oslo channel began to develop a momentum of its own by June 1993, and 
the Israelis decided to send a lawyer to the negotiations.  Yoel Singer, an Israeli 
lawyer and former military officer, had Rabin’s confidence and signalled to the 
Palestinians that the Prime Minister stood behind the negotiators (Ibid. 399, 404).  
The two old political rivals, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, managed to cooperate 
and present a united front for the negotiations.  The Palestinians, on the other hand, 
remained at a distinct disadvantage in the negotiations due to internal disputes.  
Arafat’s negotiators struggled occasionally with their English and lacked “juridical 
competence,” (Ibid.399).  Moreover, all of the Palestinian negotiators were from the 
exiled population, not from the occupied territories (Ibid.).  Divisions within Fatah 
led Arafat to prioritize negotiators he could trust; personal loyalty trumped all other 
considerations (Ibid.399-400).  Larsen suggested the Palestinians bring a lawyer to 
the negotiations, but Arafat “ignored him,” (Ibid.). 
Prior to the July meeting at Halvorsbøle, Foreign Minister Holst engaged in a 
form of shuttle diplomacy while ostensibly on vacation in Tunisia (Ibid. 410-411).  
Holst, Juul and Rød-Larsen met with Arafat—a meeting which Holst described in 
detail in a personal letter to Israeli Foreign Minister Peres (Tveit 2005:415; Waage 
2004:112-114).12  According to Abu Ala, Holst told Arafat: “Either we can seize the 
                                              
12 Ala notes that Holst briefed Peres on the meeting with Arafat, although it is unclear whether the Palestinians knew this at 
the time (Qurie 2006:201). 
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opportunity to reach a direct agreement now, or lose everything,” and also that “Israel 
has many red lines,” that necessitate compromise through “creative ambiguity” 
(Qurie 2006:200). Holst also emphasized that the Israelis might be willing to 
compromise by ceding Jericho (Tveit 2005:421).  To Peres, Holst wrote that the 
Palestinians would not compromise without the promise of Jericho (Ibid. 422). Arafat 
expressed his trust in Holst and confided that he was desperate to reach in agreement 
(Ibid. 412).  In addition, Abu Ala observes:  
It was clear to us that Holst’s purpose in holding this meeting was, among other 
things, to ascertain that Yasser Arafat was fully aware of developments in Oslo 
(Qurie 2006:201). 
Holst was unaware that Arafat had also sent a letter to Rabin, writing that he 
would “delay all sensitive issues, especially Jerusalem… if he could just get an 
interim agreement,” (Tveit 2005:415).  Abu Mazen also contacted Peres through 
Egyptian President Mubarak to warn that Rabin and US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher wanted to close down the Oslo channel (Ibid.).  However, despite the 
flood of diplomatic activity from all sides, both the eleventh and twelfth round of 
negotiations in Norway collapsed.   
 On August 16th, Rød-Larsen received word from Arafat that the PLO was ready 
to compromise on the Israeli demands (Ibid. 434).  Rød-Larsen called Holst and 
urged him to meet with Peres at Haga Slott in Stockholm, where the Israeli Foreign 
Minister stayed during a planned official visit (Ibid.).  Peres insisted they call Arafat 
from Stockholm immediately and end the negotiations the same night (Waage 
2004:133).  Once Arafat managed to assemble all of his advisors together (including, 
this time, a Lebanese attorney), Holst conveyed the dialogue between the PLO 
Chairman in Tunis and the Israeli Foreign Minister in Stockholm for several hours of 
negotiations (Tveit 2005:436-438).  During the breaks, Peres called Rabin in 
Jerusalem and the Palestinians contacted the Egyptians (Ibid.).  The marathon 
negotiating session ended in a final agreement, primarily on the basis of the Israeli 
positions (Waage 2004:133).  The Palestinians, worried about their competence in 
English, taped the entire phone conversation.  After translating the document to 
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Arabic, the Palestinians noted points in the dialogue when Holst formulated the 
Palestinian positions better than they had done, and also anticipated potential 
problems in the language they had not foreseen (Qurie 2006:240; Tveit 2005:447). 
The PLO and Israeli Foreign Ministers, Abu Ala and Shimon Peres, 
respectively, initialed the negotiated agreement in a secret ceremony in Oslo on 
August 13th, 1993.  Peres, Holst, Rød-Larsen and Juul then traveled to California to 
inform US Secretary of State Christopher and the chief US negotiator for the official 
multilateral negotiations, Dennis Ross.  Prior to the meeting, Peres suggested they 
present the Oslo accords as US-brokered agreement and Holst agreed (Tveit 
2005:451).  Christopher and Ross welcomed the agreement, but Christopher refused 
to allow the US to take credit, arguing that “the truth would come out, sooner or 
later,” (Egeland 2007:241; Tveit 2005:455).  Christopher agreed, however, to host the 
signing ceremony on the White House lawn.   
4.1.3 Declining 
The international press reaction to the signing of the Oslo Accords brought the 
Norwegian effort into the spotlight.  Although the signing ceremony took place on 
the White House lawn, the role of the Norwegian mediators soon attracted the 
attention of the international media (Waage 2004:153-155).  In October 1993, the 
United States and the European Union established the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee 
(AHLC) to coordinate assistance to the occupied territories (Ibid.172).  The US and 
the EU soon became deadlocked on the question of who should chair the AHLC; 
Norway emerged as “the compromise candidate,” (Ibid.175).  In addition to its 
leadership role, Norway contributed more than any other donor in relative terms.  
From 1993 to 1999, Norwegian aid comprised nine percent of all foreign aid to the 
occupied territories (Lilland and Kjerland 2003:107; Waage 2004:156).  
Disbursement of aid to the Palestinians did not proceed smoothly, however.  The 
Palestinian leadership lacked the administrative experience and institutions necessary 
for the implementation of economic development programs and donors balked at the 
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prospect of disbursing aid without effective mechanisms for ensuring transparency 
and accountability (Waage 2004:180).  In response, Norway led many of the 
development projects itself, fearing that a slowing of aid flows might derail the peace 
process (Lilland and Kjerland 2003:109).  Unfortunately, this meant that projects 
were evaluated less carefully than was desirable, resulting in charges that Norwegian 
aid contributed to corruption within the Palestinian administration (Ibid.). 
The original Norwegian mediators also continued to offer their services when 
called upon,13 although their role in the process leading to the Oslo II Interim 
Agreement remained minor; the parties negotiated directly, for the most part (Waage 
2004:190-191).  However, both Israel and the PLO failed to meet the timetable 
requirements established by the two Oslo agreements and continued violence 
increased support for extremist elements within each side.  In addition, support from 
international donors stumbled over crucial questions on the establishment of 
Palestinian police forces and frustration at the incompetence of the Palestinian 
administrative organs.  For its part, Israel failed to halt the ambitions of settlers and 
even Peres adopted a hard line on security in response to the growing political threat 
of the opposition.  Israeli roadblocks and increased security measures in turn crippled 
the Palestinian economy and increased support for Hamas.  In sum, a series of 
violations from both sides resulted in an escalatory spiral of violence.  Without strong 
international pressure to re-establish a peace process, the Oslo agreements fell apart.   
4.1.4 Preliminary Assessment 
Table 4.1.4 below depicts the mediation cycle framework from Table 2.2.2, 
adapted to the Middle East case.   In the “low intensity” phase, the efforts of 
Norwegian NGOs leading to the initiation of the Oslo back channel pale in 
comparison to those of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.  Although Fafo conducted a 
                                              
13 Johan Jørgen Holst remained at the forefront of Norwegian assistance to the peace process until his death in 1994.  The 
World Bank subsequently established the Johan Jørgen Holst Peace Fund to provide budgetary assistance for the 
Palestinian administration in the occupied territories (Waage 2004:184). 
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survey of the living conditions of the Palestinians living in Gaza prior to the 
beginning of the Oslo channel, the Fafo survey was preceded by years of behind-the-
scenes diplomacy and informal networking among Norwegian diplomats and 
potential contacts within the Middle East.  To be sure, Norway enjoyed a closer and 
more institutionalized relationship with Israel than with the PLO, but it had also built 
contacts within Palestinian society, not the least of which through Hans Wilhelm 
Longva’s personal relationship with Yasir Arafat.   
Table 4.1.4 Mediation Cycle Framework for the Middle East Case 
Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
• Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
develops contacts on both sides of 
the conflict and expresses 
willingness to serve as mediator. 
Fafo involvement seen as 
complementary to Foreign 
Ministry strategy   
• Parties to conflict accept 
Norwegian actors due to their 
close relationship to Israel and 
the United States, and Norway’s 
lack of material interest in conflict  
• Parties opposed to allowing the 
United States to mediate the 
conflict (due to lack of PLO 
recognition and potential for US 
to wield  leverage) 
 
• Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry offers financial 
support to Fafo for 
Track II mediation 
• Fafo contacts invited to 
participate in Oslo back 
channel negotiations 
• Parties upgrade Oslo 
channel through official 
participation 
• Signing of the DoP 
leads to US involvement 
and signing ceremony 
on White House lawn 
 
• Norway chairs AHLC, sends 
troops for TIPH and supports 
grassroots peace process 
initiatives such as P2P (through 
which Fafo takes lead) 
• International community 
supports implementation on ad 
hoc basis, ambivalent about 
enforcing Oslo Agreement when 
politically inconvenient 
• Norwegian efforts still central to 
implementation, but Norway 
lacks capacity for enforcement 
without substantial assistance of 
more powerful international 
actors 
 
The second characteristic, that Norwegians will be accepted as relatively neutral 
mediators, proved largely correct.  Both parties agreed that Norway had no material 
interest in the substance of an eventual peace agreement.  Arafat trusted the 
Norwegians to act fairly towards the PLO; he also understood and indeed appreciated 
Norway’s historically close relationship to Israel.   Perhaps at this stage, however, 
both parties underestimated Norway’s interest in simply achieving a peace 
agreement, regardless of its substance. 
Regarding the third characteristic: whether the US-led Madrid process truly 
demonstrated a great power interest in mediating between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians remains largely a question of definition.  The US pressured Israel into 
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participating in the official multilateral talks in Madrid and Washington, but these did 
not include a Palestinian delegation.  Rather, the Jordanian delegation was comprised 
of both Jordanian and Palestinian representatives.  Thus, the US undoubtedly proved 
an interest in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but not between Israel and the 
PLO. 
The Middle East case follows relatively closely the general formula depicted in 
Table 2.2.2 on page 19 for the “rising/high” phase of mediation.  The Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry cooperated closely with Fafo Director Rød-Larsen, with the former 
covering all expenses associated with the talks.  Both Fafo and the Foreign Ministry 
utilized their contact networks to invite potential negotiators,  Also, the Oslo channel 
began at a relatively unofficial level—at least on the Israeli side—and were held 
under the auspices of a Fafo conference.  However, the Oslo channel steadily evolved 
into more official negotiations as Arafat, Peres and Rabin actively increased their 
involvement.   
The final characteristic for the “rising/high” phase in Table 2.2.2 is that the 
Norwegian actors press for regional and international involvement in the mediation.  
In the Middle East case, UN involvement was ruled out from the start, owing to the 
acrimonious relationship between Israel and the UN General Assembly.  Moreover, 
the Middle East lacked an overarching regional organization that included both 
parties to the conflict.  Consequently, the Norwegian mediators did not press for 
greater regional or international organizational involvement.  Rather, Norway 
informed the United States of the Oslo agreement, along with the parties, and the 
signing ceremony was held on the US lawn. In the Middle East case, no regional or 
international institutions presented a viable alternative to this type of ad hoc 
superpower involvement. 
The “declining phase” depicted in Table 2.2.2 accurately describes the 
Norwegian effort in the post-settlement phase. Norway held the chairmanship of the 
multilateral AHLC and contributed significant financial support to the development 
of the occupied territories.  Norway also supplied personnel for the TIPH forces and 
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supported the grassroots Fafo-led “people-to-people” peace-building measures.  
Despite multilateral collaboration in the implementation phase, however, Norway’s 
efforts did not gradually fade into the periphery.  Rather, Norway often found itself in 
the position of carrying the burden for politically sensitive enforcement tasks for 
which no other state or organization would take responsibility, such as establishing a 
Palestinian police force. 
4.2 The Peace Process for Guatemala 
4.2.1 Low14 
 Following a CIA-backed coup of the democratically-elected government in 
1954, Guatemala experienced over 30 years of civil war, resulting in over 200,000 
deaths and 150,000 refugees (CEH 1999).15  The guerrilla insurgency movement 
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) was first established in 1962 as a Marxist opponent to the 
military government in Guatemala City (Costello 1997:11).  The guerrilla movement 
encountered a brutal counter-insurgency campaign from the government, including 
the systematic use of extra-judicial executions and kidnappings prior to general 
elections (Høgdahl 1994:35).  The Guatemalan state remained entirely in the control 
of the army, which sustained power through “an indiscriminate and uncontrolled use 
of violence,” (Lux de Coti 2000:108).  Moreover, as a means of combating 
communism, US intelligence agencies assisted the Guatemalan army through training 
and intelligence sharing (Ibid. 110). 
Although FAR was nearly eliminated in the 1960’s, by 1982 various militia 
groups combined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
                                              
14 The following description of the background conditions (two paragraphs) is an excerpt from Bersagel (2007:1-2). 
15 The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) was established by treaty in 1994 with a mandate “to 
clarify with objectivity, equity and impartiality, the human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the armed 
confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan people,” (CEH 1999: “Prologue”) 
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(Jonas 1991:138).  In the late 1970’s the guerrilla movement included 6,000-8,000 
members, yet remained at a stalemate with the government forces, who enjoyed tacit 
(and sometimes explicit) support from the US government (Costello 1997:13-14; 
Dillon et al. 2 April 1995).  The guerrilla groups were responsible for 32 massacres 
and numerous kidnappings.  However, the Guatemalan truth commission ultimately 
reported that guerrilla actions accounted for only three percent of all human rights 
abuses during the civil war, compared to 93 percent “committed by agents of the 
State, in particular the army” (Lux de Coti 2000:113).16 
 Underlying the conflict between the military government and the insurgent 
groups was a social and economic system characterized by staggering inequality.  
Although members of the indigenous Maya people comprised 60 percent of the 
population, Guatemala remained politically dominated by the Ladino minority 
(Seider 1997:68; Jonas 1991:65-67).17  While the Mayan majority remained largely 
outside of the conflict from the beginning, the URNG began recruiting from the 
indigenous population in the 1970’s; it also identified more closely with the Mayan 
cause than the government (Costello 1997:13; Jonas 1991:136-139).  Moreover, 
massive internal and external refugee movements, rural massacres and the 
government-led deforestation of highland areas exacerbated the already highly 
inequitable distribution of land and tenuous economic status of the Mayan majority 
(Ibid.).  
In the 1980’s, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias launched the Contadora 
process—a regional forum for the various peace processes in Central America 
(Krøvel 2001: 23).  The Contadora process led to the Esquipulas agreement of 1987, 
which stipulated that each warring Central American government should initiate 
peace talks with the respective rebel group, and that no government should interfere 
                                              
16 Henrik Hovland, an investigator for the Guatemalan truth commission, observes that the guerrilla groups may have 
committed a larger share of the atrocities, but that the investigators were hampered by “political bias, lack of investigative 
skills” and the investigators’ failure to visit many remote areas (2000:122). 
17 “Ladino” refers to Latin Americans of mixed Spanish and indigenous ancestry. 
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in the civil wars of its neighboring countries (Jonas 1991:202).  By the end of the 
decade, the Guatemalan government faced significant economic pressure to reach a 
settlement with the URNG in order to attract much-needed foreign investment 
(Costello 1997:15; Salvesen 21 November 2007).   Thus, both sides were faced with 
a military stalemate and economic ruin (Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003:252). 
Norwegian involvement in conflict resolution efforts in Guatemala began 
through Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) following the 1976 earthquake (Skauen 20 
March 2007).  NCA’s coordinator in Guatemala, Petter Skauen, describes how upon 
arriving, the Mayan people told him the real humanitarian catastrophe was not the 
earthquake, but rather, the war between the government and the guerrilla groups 
(Skauen 20 March 2007).  As a permanent representative for NCA in Guatemala, 
Skauen developed a network of relationships at all levels of Guatemalan society and 
on all sides of the conflict.  The government initially suspected NCA of maintaining 
alliances with the guerrilla groups, given NCA’s development aid projects in regions 
known as guerrilla strongholds (Ibid).  However, NCA also assisted in development 
projects directed by the army, building contacts within the government (Ibid).  In 
1986, Skauen accompanied members of the URNG on a visit to Norway to meet with 
Latin America solidarity groups and to allow URNG members to present their case to 
the Foreign Ministry (Ibid).  Skauen also invited one of Guatemala’s military leaders 
(and the director of the army’s aid program) to Norway for a few low-key meetings 
with politicians.  Both trips were kept secret, but the military visitor was killed 
shortly after his return to Guatemala (Ibid). 
Throughout the 1980’s, the URNG expanded its operations abroad, seeking 
support for the guerrilla cause from European governments and NGOs (Stålsett 20 
May 2007).  The Guatemalan government (via representatives of the Committee for 
National Reconciliation, or CRN) planned to meet with the URNG for negotiations in 
1987 in Madrid, Spain (AP 1987).  However, the Guatemalan army remained 
opposed to any type of peace talks with the guerrilla movement and the meeting was 
aborted (Skauen 20 March 2007).  In 1988, Jorge Rosal, the URNG’s representative 
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in Switzerland, met with Paul Wee at the International Labor Organization 
headquarters in Geneva.  Wee was then serving as the Assistant Secretary-General for 
International Affairs for the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)—also located in 
Geneva (Wee 6 February 2008).  Wee introduced Rosal to LWF Secretary-General 
Gunnar Stålsett, and the three discussed the possibility of sending a joint LWF-
Vatican delegation to Guatemala to support the Esquipulas process (Wee 6 February 
2008).   
In October 1989, Wee represented LWF on a joint delegation trip to Latin 
America.  On October 13th, Wee and a Lutheran pastor working for LWF in El 
Salvador, Phillip Anderson, met with Guatemalan Defense Minister Hector Gramajo 
(Wee 6 February 2008).  Wee’s description of the meeting follows: 
At first, the Minister of Defense just laughed and said the guerrillas were on the 
run anyway.  The USSR was waning and with it, the support for such movements.  
The Minister said he didn’t take a ragtag bunch of guerrillas seriously.  “We are 
the people with power,” he said.  He talked in a macho way about their power.  
Then we told him, “How many of his commanders had been killed? Listen, you’re 
losing a lot of good men in the field.  Plus, your country is so unstable; you can’t 
produce agriculture and export it without great cost.  Plus, the European 
Community is willing to consider limits on imports of Guatemalan products.  
Economically, the country would suffer.”  We also included (appealed to) his 
legacy as a person who had brought 30 years of civil war to an end.  He listened 
and said he would meet with members of the military high command.  We waited 
in his office.  He returned from the meeting and said he would be willing to meet 
outside the country with the URNG (6 February 2008). 
Following the delegation’s return from Latin America, LWF first contacted 
Sweden about hosting the meeting.  However, the Swedish embassy in Guatemala 
was attacked soon after and one of the guards was killed.  Although the Swedish 
ambassador doubted the attack had any connection to LWF’s request, Sweden 
declined nonetheless (Ibid).  Consequently, in deciding where to host the meeting 
Stålsett considered both Norway and Germany: 
…Germany, because it was a very strong base group [of NGOs] in Germany 
that was involved… in the developments in Guatemala before it became the 
peace process. … But in Norway, I had the access directly to the Foreign 
Ministry.  …The then-Foreign Minister…Bondevik, had… visited Guatemala 
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and his… State Secretary…Knut Vollebaek… also was engaged, and these two 
were old friends of mine, so I could call them… directly and say, “We need 
funds and we need security and we need a welcome greeting from the Foreign 
Ministry. Can you provide this?  (Stålsett 30 May 2007). 
Bondevik accepted the request without hesitation and insisted that the Foreign 
Ministry would gladly cover the costs of hosting the meeting (Ibid).  In order to 
identify potential negotiators from the government side, Stålsett contacted Petter 
Skauen (Sørbø et al. 1998:11-12).  The government sent a delegation under the 
Committee for National Reconciliation (CRN) banner and the URNG sent four 
members of their diplomatic/political commission.  In this way, both sides could deny 
the leadership had ever been involved in negotiations (Wee 6 February 2008). 
4.2.2 Rising/High 
The first formal negotiations between the Guatemalan government (via the 
CRN) and the URNG took place in Oslo, Norway in March 1990 (Stålsett 20 May 
2007; Wee 6 February 2008).  Stålsett and Skauen met the parties at the airport.  
Jorge Serrano, who later became president, attended on behalf of the CRN.  Four or 
five of the negotiators had attended secondary school together in Guatemala City and 
now found each other on opposing sides (Skauen 20 March 2007; Stålsett 20 May 
2007).  The proposed mediator, Catholic Archbishop Quezada Toruño, fell ill in the 
days prior to the meeting and remained hospitalized in Miami (Ibid).   
Norwegian Church Aid decided not to participate in the meeting, fearing 
reprisals against local staff in Guatemala (Salvesen 21 November 2007; Stålsett 20 
May 2007).   As a result, the Committee for International and Ecumenical Relations 
of the State Church of Norway, led by Secretary-General Trond Bakkevig, officially 
hosted the meeting (Salvesen 21 November 2007).   In addition, Skauen became 
formally associated with LWF, while the Foreign Ministry paid his salary through 
NCA (Skauen 20 March 2007; Stålsett 20 May 2007).  The Foreign Ministry and the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) already paid 
approximately 80 percent of NCA’s budget for development and humanitarian relief 
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work (as is typical for Norwegian aid organizations) but NCA remained officially 
outside of the peace process (Skauen 20 March 2007).   
For the first evening, the Norwegian hosts greeted the Guatemalan negotiators 
with a welcome party at the Heftye Villa at Holmenkollen (Ibid).  The parties stayed 
up until four o’clock in the morning drinking whiskey and talking (Ibid).  At about 
nine o’clock the next morning, the first meeting opened with a formal greeting from 
State Secretary Vollebæk; Foreign Minister Bondevik also attended.  Beyond this, the 
Foreign Ministry remained in the background (Bondevik 2006:271; Skauen 20 March 
2007).  Stålsett describes the format of the negotiations as follows: 
[After the brief greeting] we said, “Now it’s up to you.  You chair the meeting 
yourself.  It’s your meeting.  We have provided the support for you to come 
here and you know what the agenda is about.  We will be here in this house, but 
not in the room,” (Stålsett 20 May 2007). 
According to Hilde Salvesen, “one important thing about this meeting in March 
1990 was that the guerrillas were somehow put on the same level as a negotiating 
partner,” (Salvesen 21 November 2007).18  The Norwegian facilitators made a 
concentrated effort to ensure the quality of the accommodations, the food, the amount 
of informal conversation—everything—was equal.  This did not, however, prevent 
the parties from arguing “who had the nicer hotel—or even the biggest mini-bar,” 
(Wee 6 February 2008). 
By the end of the week, the Guatemalan representatives and their hosts sat down 
to dinner “lamenting the fact that there was no agreement,” (Wee 6 February 2008).  
At this point, “an interesting dynamic” developed (Ibid).  URNG negotiator Jorge 
Rosal rose from the table and addressed his counterparts from the CRN: 
Listen, it’s been wonderful to be with you this week.  I just want you to know 
that I have made a number of mistakes these past few years.  I am really sorry 
                                              
18 Hilde Salvesen, a member of the World Student Christian Federation, assisted in the logistics of the meetings and 
attended lunch and dinner with the respective Guatemalan delegations, along with her fellow students (Salvesen 21 
November 2007).   
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about that, because there are 200,000 people dead.  I just wanted you to know 
that is partly my fault (Rosal, quoted in Wee 6 February 2008).   
Wee remembers that he “was just shaking” after hearing Rosal’s speech: 
Then, someone from the other side got up and said the same thing.  Then 
everyone in a circle got up and did the same thing.  Everyone was crying and 
embracing each other.  Somebody said, “Let’s go back across the street and see if 
we can’t pound out this agreement,” (Ibid). 
The negotiators returned directly to their hotel and “four hours later, they came 
up with a page and a half” agreement (Ibid).  Bondevik hosted the signing ceremony 
the following morning, March 30th, for what became known as the Oslo Accord for 
Guatemala.  The agreement laid the framework for the Guatemalan peace process and 
was unique in recognizing both the “substantial” underlying issues of social 
inequality and human rights, as well as the “operational” issues surrounding the 
military conflict (Sørbø et al. 1998, 12).  In large part, the agreement to negotiate on 
“substantial” issues first reflected the URNG’s strategic position.  Stålsett observes 
that the URNG was “far more advanced strategically,” (20 May 2007; Salvesen 21 
November 2007).  The guerrilla organization understood that the government would 
be able to safely ignore the URNG’s grievances once the military demobilization 
process occurred. 
Following the Oslo meeting, Stålsett told the parties that the LWF “had done the 
role befitting an NGO” and would now “pull back” from the process (Wee 6 
February 2008).  Wee reports that the parties reacted strongly to this suggestion: 
“Both sides asked the LWF to hang in there,” (Ibid). Accordingly, LWF established a 
consortium of faith-based NGOs, including the National Council of Churches, the 
World Council of Churches and the Latin American Council of Churches (together 
known as “the Four Councils”) (Ibid).  Throughout, Stålsett and Skauen (who now 
represented LWF) kept in close contact with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 
reporting on political updates through the Norwegian Ambassador to Mexico, Rolf 
Berg (Krøvel 2001:25-28).  Skauen also built on his personal connections with the 
leaders on both sides of the conflict, taking each on excursions outside Guatemala, 
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including to his cottage in Norway (Skauen 20 March 2007).  The Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry enthusiastically supported the NGO initiative and made it clear to 
the parties that the Norwegian state would be more than willing to host additional 
meetings and eventually, a signing ceremony (Krøvel 2001:26).  Krøvel interprets 
Norway’s eagerness as a strategic move to preempt other would-be mediators (Ibid).     
Egeland maintains that the success of peace negotiations depends significantly 
on whether the parties are both “willing and able” to commit to peace (Egeland 22 
October 2007).  In the case of the URNG, Egeland argues that they were willing, but 
not able (Ibid.).  Accordingly, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry assisted the URNG 
financially—paying for flights to the various meetings, lodging and meals, etc.  The 
Foreign Ministry even paid for international legal assistance for the URNG (Egeland 
22 October 2007).  These measures were primarily funneled through LWF and the 
Norwegian Embassy in Mexico (Salvesen 15 May 2008).  After 1993, the Foreign 
Ministry began to clearly allocate funds to the URNG (rather than the more 
ambiguous funding requests used earlier), amounting to approximately five million 
NOK (Krøvel 2001:29).  Krøvel argues that these funds gave the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry leverage over the URNG, which it used in the negotiations on the truth 
commission (Ibid). 
The UN became involved as an observer to the process in 1991, but its role 
remained limited.  However, the Group of Friends was established in 1992, including 
Spain, Colombia, Portugal, the United States, Venezuela, Mexico and Norway.  
Norway’s inclusion confirmed the significance of its role in the peace process.  In the 
same year, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to 
Rigoberta Menchu, a prominent Guatemalan leader dedicated to indigenous rights for 
the Mayan people.  Although the Norwegian facilitators had no formal role in the 
selection process, the award was interpreted as a sign of Norway’s commitment to 
peace in Guatemala.  Regardless, the Norwegian NGOs, and not the Foreign 
Ministry, set the tone for Norwegian engagement during this period.   
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In May 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano committed a “self-coup” by 
suspending the parliament and declaring a state of emergency.  The army 
subsequently withdrew its support from Serrano and the latter resigned in early June.  
At this point, the role of the UN was upgraded from observer to mediator status, 
replacing Archbishop Toruño, who had served as a mediator following his recovery 
from illness (Stålsett 20 May 2007).  Stålsett had supported stronger UN involvement 
for some time, believing Toruño had been “over-asked” and “did not have all the 
competence or the energy to cover” the complexity of the negotiations (Ibid).  
Moreover, involving the UN would send a strong signal about the seriousness of the 
peace talks.  Toruño objected to diminishing his role and the Guatemalan government 
only reluctantly agreed to UN involvement (Ibid).   
The first two UN mediators were rejected by one or both of the parties, but from 
1994, Jean Arnault filled the role and gained the confidence of both sides (Stålsett 20 
May 2007).  Additionally, the UN deployed a human rights observer mission, 
MINUGUA, to Guatemala (Salvesen 2002:27).  A parallel peace process also began 
in 1994, involving representatives of Guatemalan civil society.  Four Assembly of 
Civil Society (ASC) meetings were held in Mexico, Guatemala, Canada and the 
United States.  On behalf of the “Four Councils,” Stålsett chaired the US meeting and 
led an ecumenical service for the participants in the Church of the Reformation in 
downtown Washington, D.C. (Wee 6 February 2008).  The US State Department 
hosted a luncheon for the main delegates, signaling a decisive change in policy given 
the State Department’s previous listing of the URNG as a foreign terrorist 
organization (Stålsett 20 May 2007).  The Norwegian Foreign Ministry remained 
primarily involved in the official negotiations and was not represented at the ASC 
meetings above the ambassador level (Stålsett 20 May 2007). 
In April 1994, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry developed a set of guidelines for 
additional development aid to support democratization and the rights of marginalized 
groups in Guatemala (Ekern 2000:14).  Known as the “peace package,” the new aid 
initiative took inspiration from the aid package developed in support of the Middle 
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East peace process (Ibid. 14).  The Foreign Ministry channelled funding through 
Norwegian NGOs operating in Guatemala, such as Norwegian Church Aid, 
Norwegian Peoples Aid, Norway’s Save the Children and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (Ibid. 14).  Partially in order to improve coordination between the Foreign 
Ministry and the various aid agencies operating in Guatemala, Norway established a 
provisional embassy in Guatemala City in 1995.  To a certain extent, the 
simultaneous development and diplomatic initiatives proved complementary.  Ekern 
writes: 
…General knowledge about Norway’s participation in the group of friendly 
countries that shepherded the peace process certainly contributed to generate 
positive feelings towards the Norwegian NGOs in many Guatemalan contexts 
(2000:24). 
Ekern notes, however, that despite Norwegian Church Aid’s involvement in the 
diplomatic effort (through Petter Skauen), the NGOs involved in development 
assistance were rarely informed about the ongoing political negotiations (Ekern 
2000:24). 
By 1995, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry began to grow impatient with the 
slow pace of negotiations.  In an interview with the Norwegian daily Aftenposten, 
State Secretary Jan Egeland emphasized the significant Norwegian financial 
contribution to Guatemala, cautioning that “we will not be able to continue to give 
Guatemala so much attention if the peace process continues indefinitely,” (Christian 
1995:7).19  Egeland says his words were not meant as a threat to cut off finding, but 
rather, “that Norway couldn’t spend so much time, energy and money,” on an 
unending peace process (Egeland 22 October 2007).  However, independent 
commentators argue that Norway used development aid as both a carrot and a stick 
(Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003:254). 
                                              
19 “[Risen bak speilet er at] vi ikke vil kunne fortsette å gi Guatemala så mye oppmerksomhet dersom fredsprosessen skal 
fortsette på ubestemt tid,” Egeland quoted in (Christian 1995:7). 
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On December 29th, 1996, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry hosted the signing 
ceremony for the ceasefire in the Oslo City Hall.  According to Egeland, only about 
five Norwegian actors had been involved in the mediation: himself, Skauen, Stålsett, 
and Norwegian Ambassador to Guatemala Arne Åsheim (in addition to the assistants 
of each) (Egeland 22 October 2007).  
4.2.3 Declining 
Following the signing of the ceasefire, MINUGUA’s mission expanded to 
include implementation tasks, led by former UN mediator Jean Arnault (Salvesen 
2002:27).  While MINUGUA’s mandate included verification of the terms of the 
implementation process, MINUGUA had no independent power to enforce violations 
of the accords (Ibid. 28).  Although military hostilities ended with the signing of the 
1996 agreement, an upsurge in violent crime throughout Guatemala has come to pose 
the most significant challenge to peace and security.  Moreover, given the civil police 
authorities’ inability to contain a rising crime rate, the Guatemalan military remains 
in control of domestic security, contrary to the terms of the demobilization accords 
(Salvesen 2001:56, 60; Salvesen 2002:9-11).  In May 1999, a referendum designed to 
incorporate the peace agreements into the Guatemalan constitution was defeated 
(Salvesen 2002:23).  The military interpreted this result as a mandate in favour of 
their political legitimacy and their continued efforts to block the peace process (Ibid.). 
On a visit to Guatemala in 2000, Stålsett observed that while the conflict itself 
had ended, the underlying social conditions that gave rise to civil war remained—
namely, a highly unequal distribution of wealth and land, weak civil society 
institutions and the lack of an independent and impartial judiciary (Hjorthol 2000).  
Salvesen confirms this assessment: “Less than 1% of the farmers own 75% of the 
land (and all the best land), while 96% of the producers are concentrated on 20% of 
the land,” (2002:15).  Although the Guatemalan peace accords were unique in 
addressing the “root causes” of conflict, their implementation continues to lag (Ibid. 
19).   
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Salvesen believes part of the problem lies in the content of the accords, which 
established an overly-ambitious timetable for implementation (Ibid. 31).  Failure to 
meet the timetable, in turn, generated pessimism about the entire peace process 
(Ibid.).  Salvesen also points out that the agreement on demobilization failed to 
include trust-building measures, leaving the URNG without any leverage once 
demobilization had been completed (Ibid. 20).  A second problem concerns the lack 
of ownership in the accords, which accordingly became a source of “horse-trading” in 
the parliament (Salvesen 14 May 2008).  Moreover, the civil society organizations so 
vocal during the peace process proved less competent in peace-building than 
originally assumed.  In part, their weakness owes to a lack of management, as civil 
society leaders flocked to politics (Ibid. 24).  However, many of the civil society 
organizations had never been as representative or as influential as they appeared. 
Even during the process, Former Norwegian State Secretary Jan Egeland held a 
certain degree of scepticism towards these “shell” NGOs: 
I wondered: who did some of these NGOs represent?  You have a Guatemalan 
women’s organization with six women and a charter, but no membership 
structure, [and they are telling the URNG]… ‘If you don’t vote as we demand, 
you are against the women of Guatemala,’ (Egeland 22 October 2007).    
The challenge of wider reconciliation also involves persuading former 
combatants to take ownership of the process.  Egeland emphasizes that the signatories 
of peace agreements are often “not popular… outside of Oslo” and that their decision 
to reach an agreement with the enemy “is not easily portrayed,” (22 October 2007).  
The signatories must not only explain to their followers why peace is desirable, but 
also, “what did we fight for?” (Ibid.).  This challenge proved formidable for both 
parties. 
On the development side, a Consultative Group (CG) of donor countries and 
financial institutions was established to coordinate international aid flows to 
Guatemala (Ibid. 29).  The Norwegian Foreign Ministry also disbursed over NOK 70 
million in aid to specific one-year projects for peace between 1995 and 1998 through 
the “peace package,” in addition to existing development and humanitarian aid 
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(Ekern 2000:15). Grants were given to both UN agencies and to Norwegian NGOs.  
The Norwegian NGOs’ local partner NGOs actually carried out the projects and none 
of these programs from either the UN or the NGOs were reviewed by the Foreign 
Ministry (Ibid. 21).  The newly-established Norwegian embassy simply did not have 
the administrative capacity to complete the reviews (Ekern 2000:22).20  Accordingly, 
peace package funds went mainly to the support of existing NGO activities (Ibid. 23).  
The Foreign Ministry commissioned the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights to 
complete a formal review of the peace package in 1997 (Ekern et al. 1998:7).  The 
researchers found wide variation in the quality of individual peace projects, but as a 
general weakness, few incorporated the government in peace-building initiatives; 
rather, these “tended to take the form of campaigns against the Guatemalan 
government,” (Ekern 2000:24; Ekern et al. 1998:67). 
4.2.4 Preliminary Assessment 
Table 4.2.4 adapts the mediation cycle framework to the Guatemalan case.  
Regarding the “low intensity” phase, Norwegian Church Aid had been active in 
Guatemala since the 1976 earthquake and regional director Petter Skauen built a 
network of contacts on not only both sides of the conflict, but also those outside of it.  
Moreover, no great power demonstrated interest in mediating the conflict.  In fact, the 
role of the United States in the Guatemalan civil war is perhaps most generously 
characterized as profoundly counterproductive.  Lastly, while the parties to the 
conflict did not choose Norway per se, but rather, the Lutheran World Federation to 
host the mediation, Norway’s lack of a colonial past and of a material interest in the 
conflict undoubtedly made Oslo an uncontroversial site for negotiations.  More 
importantly, Norway’s record as a provider of foreign aid both generated goodwill 
among the parties and provided the Norwegian actors with a network of Guatemalan 
contacts to draw from.  One slight deviation from the original framework in Table 
                                              
20 The Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala was upgraded to permanent status in 1997. 
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2.2.2 on page 19 is that LWF is not a Norwegian organization, but rather, an 
international organization that happened to be led by a Norwegian with close 
connections to the government.  Given the variety of potential sites for negotiations, 
it is unlikely that Norway would have hosted the meetings without Stålsett’s 
leadership of the LWF.    
Table 4.2.4 Mediation Cycle Framework for the Guatemala Case 
Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
• NCA establishes presence in 
the local region through 
long-standing development 
projects, relationships with 
actors on all sides of the 
conflict 
• Parties to conflict accept 
offer of mediation from LWF 
and allow talks to be held in 
Oslo due to Norway’s lack 
of a colonial past and of a 
material interest in conflict, 
as well as history of 
Norwegian foreign aid to 
region. 
• No great powers currently 
show interest in mediating 
conflict themselves. 
 
• Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
finances Track II mediation 
through LWF and Ecumenical 
Council 
• Negotiations in Oslo lead to 
agreement on framework for 
Guatemalan peace process 
• Contacts made through NCA 
and LWF utilized to invite 
actors to talks.  Norwegian 
actors guarantee secrecy of 
eventual negotiations and offer 
to hold them in Oslo 
• Group of Friends supports 
process from 1992.  Momentum 
in talks and Serrano’s “self-
coup” leads Norway to press for 
greater UN involvement. 
 
• Norway continues to support 
grassroots peace process 
through Norwegian NGOs, 
but local NGOs less capable 
than earlier assumed. 
• UN MINUGUA observer 
mission assists with 
implementation of ceasefire 
and Consultative Group 
coordinates international 
donors 
• Norway pledges 
development aid tied to 
eventual peace agreement 
(“peace package”), but 
otherwise, moves into 
background of mediation 
efforts. 
 
Regarding the “rising/high” intensity phase of mediation, the Guatemalan case 
again dovetails fairly neatly with the proposed characteristics.  The Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry financially supported the Track II negotiations held in Oslo, to 
which both sides sent officials whose efforts could be denied as unrepresentative of 
the respective Guatemalan government and URNG leadership.  The Foreign Ministry 
offered the delegates a secure venue for negotiations and the State Church of Norway 
served as the sponsor, owing to NCA’s reluctance to link itself officially to the peace 
process.  The outcome of this meeting, the March 30th Oslo Agreement, marked the 
opening of an official negotiation process.  However, the increased involvement of 
international organizations appears to stem not only from the momentum arising 
within the mediation process, but also as a reaction to Serrrano’s “self-coup.” The 
establishment of the Group of Friends in 1992 appears connected to the progress 
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made in negotiations.  However, UN involvement remained minimal prior to 
Serrano’s exit.  Rather, UN mediation was seen as both a means of indicating the 
seriousness of the channel and placing international pressure on the actors to prevent 
the type of political chaos Serrano’s “self-coup” generated. 
According to Table 2.2.2, the “declining” intensity phase includes Norwegian 
efforts to support a grassroots peace process, through which NGOs take the lead.  In 
the Guatemala case, however, the Norwegian NGOs and their international partners 
supported grassroots ASC meetings before an agreement was signed.  Following the 
1996 ceasefire, Norwegian NGOs (including NCA, Save the Children Norway, 
Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Refugee Council) channelled the 
majority of Norwegian “peace package” assistance through local partner 
organizations.  Nevertheless, many of the ASC-represented NGOs proved far less 
effective in assisting with peace-building initiatives during the implementation phase.  
The UN assisted in the implementation phase through the MINUGUA observer 
mission, led by mediator Jean Arnault, and the Consultative Group of donor countries 
directed the administration of international development aid to Guatemala.  
Consistent with the Table 2.3.2 framework, Norway’s role in the implementation 
phase has taken a relatively low profile internationally, as demonstrated by the 
limited mention of Norway’s efforts in academic literature on the Guatemalan peace 
process produced by non-Norwegian researchers. 
4.3 The Sudan Peace Process 
4.3.1 Low 
The background characteristics of the nearly fifty-year-long civil war between 
the Northern and Southern region of Sudan include tensions among rival ethnic 
groups, a troubled colonial past and weak political control outside of the capitol, 
Khartoum.  The boundaries of present-day Sudan reflect the administrative 
imperatives of the British colonial authority, rather than any indigenous political 
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identification.  Sudan became an independent state only in 1956, when the British 
ceded political control to the Afro-Arabic Northern leaders in Khartoum (El-
Battahani 2006:12; Deng 1995:11).  While significant ethnic, religious and economic 
diversity within both the North and the South cautions against oversimplification, a 
main fault line emerged between the predominantly Islamic and Afro-Arabic North 
and the predominantly Christian and black African South.   
From 1955 until 1972, conflict raged in what is perhaps most accurately 
described as an amalgam of “interlocking civil wars,” (El-Battahani 2006:10).  The 
two main points of contention between the North and the South, however, concerned 
whether Sudan should adopt a unified or federal structure and whether the country 
should employ an Islamic or a secular legal system (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:80).  
While Khartoum advocated a unitary government and the state-wide application of 
sharia law, rebel groups such as the Anyanya sought greater autonomy for the 
Southern regions and a secular basis for political authority (Deng 1995:140-141; Iyob 
and Khadiagala 2006:80). 
In 1972, Northern President Ja’far Numeiri and South Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SSLM) leader Joseph Lagu signed the Addis Ababa Agreement.  In 
addition to the ceasefire, the Addis Ababa Agreement established a “short-lived 
administrative structure for the autonomous south,” with a capitol in Juba (Iyob and 
Khadiagala 2006:75).  The Addis Ababa Agreement also paved the way for the first 
Norwegian NGO to begin work in Sudan. At the invitation of the Sudan Council of 
Churches, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) began a program for assisting with the 
repatriation of refugees (COWI 1997:14).  NCA’s activities expanded to include 
development work in the Southern region, in cooperation with the Sudanese Relief 
and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA), a relief organization closely connected to the 
Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (COWI 1997:27, 17).  Faced 
with the difficulty of administering aid within Sudan’s divided political environment, 
NCA chose to establish separate offices for directing the respective operations in the 
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North and in the South: the former, in Khartoum; and the latter, in Nairobi (COWI 
1997:35).   
In 1978, oil was discovered in Southern Sudan (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:88).  
Unsurprisingly, in 1983, Numeiri claimed oil revenues for Khartoum and split the 
south into three separate administrative regions in an effort to weaken Southern 
political unity (El-Battahani 2006:13; Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:88).  Numeiri also 
“moved relentlessly toward imposing Islamic law,” gaining the support of the 
politically influential Muslim Brotherhood (Deng 1995:12).  In response to these 
developments, John Garang established the SPLM/A from his base in Ethiopia and 
began waging war against the North (El-Battahani 2006:13).  Garang advocated a 
vision of a “New Sudan,” in which a federal system would protect southern 
autonomy and in which political authority would derive from a secular, rather than an 
Islamic, legal basis.  By the end of 1983, the Addis Ababa Agreement had fallen 
apart, with a sustained military effort from the SPLM/A against the North and 
Khartoum’s arming of paramilitary groups to wage war against SPLM/A strongholds 
in the south.   
In 1985, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) began operations in Sudan, in 
partnership with the SRRA (COWI 1997:17-19).  In contrast to NCA’s attempt to 
avoid partiality, NPA explicitly supported the SPLM/A cause (Ibid.).  NPA’s close 
relationship to the SPLM/A proved useful, however, following the UN negotiated 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989.  OLS consisted of an agreement between 
the government in the North (now controlled by Omer al-Bashir) and the SPLM/A to 
allow humanitarian agencies to administer relief to civilians “trapped in war-zones” 
(Rolandsen 2005:30).  The OLS agreement did not, however, grant foreign NGOs 
access to areas controlled by the SPLM/A, owing to Khartoum’s opposition (Ibid. 
31).  As a result, by 1992, NPA provided food and medical assistance to civilians 
within regions in which no other foreign NGO operated (COWI 1997:19, 27).  NPA’s 
strategy attracted no small measure of controversy, however.  Both NCA and NPA 
received a relatively equal amount of funding from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 
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roughly 50 million NOK per year (Sørbø et al. 1998:27),  but it was no secret that 
NPA’s food aid often went directly to the SPLM/A’s front lines (COWI 1997:20). 21  
As stated in an evaluation report for the Foreign Ministry, NPA efforts involved:  
…Supplying food and medical services very close to the front-line …allowing 
families to remain in inhospitable areas to support soldiers on the front 
…allowing the sale of relief supplies to generate resources for military 
procurement and… allowing the education of young men whom the SPLA 
hoped to recruit as its future cadres (1997:47). 
The net result of the Foreign Ministry’s funding of both NPA and NCA was 
confusion over whether the Norwegian government intended to simply support 
development aid to Sudanese civilians or take a political stand in a civil war (COWI 
1997:53-54).  NPA’s role in the conflict deepened in 1992, following the loss of one 
of the SPLM/A’s strongest supporters, the Ethiopian Mengistu regime.  The SPLM/A 
split into two factions along ethnic lines; Riek Machar led the splinter group 
SPLM/United against John Garang’s mainstream SPLM/A (COWI 1997:18; Iyob and 
Khadiagala 2006:93-94).  A member of the NPA staff videotaped a SPLM/United-led 
massacre of a rival ethnic village and the video was broadcast widely in the Western 
media, decisively strengthening international support for the mainstream SPLM/A, 
and consequently, NPA’s own relationship to Garang (COWI 1997:18). 
In 1993, both Garang and Machar met separately with Norwegian State 
Secretary Jan Egeland, then occupied by the Oslo back channel for the Middle East 
(COWI 1997:23).22  Concurrently, Bashir requested assistance in mediating the civil 
war with the South from the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD) 23 (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:103).  A committee of IGAD 
members comprised the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia and chaired 
                                              
21 The largest donor to NPA’s Sudan operations during the 1990’s was the US government, through the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (COWI 1997:32). 
22 The 1997 evaluation report names the Norwegian “Foreign Minister” as the main figure in the channel, meaning Johan 
Jørgen Holst (COWI 1997:23).  This is incorrect; Egeland initiated the channel (Vraalsen 25 April 2008). 
23 IGADD was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996. 
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by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi agreed to mediate the conflict (Ibid.). The 
following January, before IGAD negotiations began, Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
officials on a visit to Khartoum broached the subject of secret negotiations between 
the North and South (Ibid).  IGAD peace talks began in March 1994 (Iyob and 
Khadiagala 2006:105), while Norway simultaneously attempted to persuade Garang 
to enter secret negotiations (COWI 1997:23).   Garang had “reservations about the 
‘timing’ of the Norwegian initiative,” but ultimately agreed to negotiate (Ibid.). 
The Oslo back channel for the Sudan culminated in four meetings between the 
Government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A between March and June 1994, involving 
approximately three to four members of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, including 
Vraalsen, Egeland, and Kjell Harald Dahlen (COWI 1997:23; Odin and Henden 
1994; Vraalsen 25 April 2008).  The Resident Representative of NCA, Halvor 
Aschjem also assisted the talks by “managing transport arrangements,” “conveying 
messages between [the] MFA and SPLA,” and “providing Dr. Garang with a mobile 
satellite phone,” (COWI 1997:24; Berg 1994).24  In addition, the Christian Michelsen 
Institute provided a cover for the talks.  CMI researcher Gunnar Sørbø insisted the 
meetings at Holmenkollen Park Hotel were held as part of an “academic conference,” 
(Bjellaanes 1994).  Negotiations ended in June, when an article in a Norwegian 
Christian newspaper, Vårt Land, received a tip from SPLM/A officials and published 
an exposé of the secret channel (Hødnebø 28 March 2008; NTB 1994).  But, 
according to Tom Vraalsen, a participant in the talks on behalf of the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry, the dissolution of the secret channel resulted from both parties’ 
unwillingness to come to an agreement (Vraalsen 25 April 2008).  Both the Eritrean 
and the US governments criticized the Norwegian back channel, which “at best 
confused the parallel peace effort by IGADD, at worst undermined or derailed it,” 
(COWI 1997:24).   
                                              
24 The 1997 evaluation report states that the “Resident Representative of NPA” assisted in the talks (COWI 1997).  
Aftenposten reported, however, that NCA Regional Representative Halvor Aschjem was involved (Berg 1994; Beck et al. 
1994).  This seems more likely, particularly given Aschjem’s later role in the IGAD talks for the Foreign Ministry.   
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With the failure of the Oslo talks, Norway became officially involved in the 
IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)25 of Western countries, established in the summer of 
1994 to support the official mediation (Ibid. 105).  Four years later, a “combination of 
drought, famine and heavy fighting in southern Sudan” attracted international 
attention to the civil war, not least, within Norway (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  The 
new Minister of International Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, interpreted the 
crisis in Sudan as a sign that humanitarian aid would achieve only meagre results 
without a political solution to the civil war (Ibid.).  Frafjord Johnson’s interest in East 
Africa was personal as well.  The daughter of Norwegian missionaries, Frafjord 
Johnson was born in Tanzania, spoke fluent Swahili and wrote her graduate thesis in 
social anthropology on the country of her birth (Stokke 30 August 2003).  When the 
chairmanship of the IPF Forum became vacant, Frafjord Johnsen volunteered to take 
the seat and began assembling a team of Norwegian experts to assist in a more 
assertive approach to the Sudan peace process (Frafjord Johnson 15 March 2005; 
Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  The University of Bergen had for nearly three decades 
engaged in academic cooperation with the University of Khartoum, and Bergen’s 
Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) boasted a strong research profile on Sudan.  
Hence, Frafjord Johnson invited CMI’s Kjell Hødnebø, a historian educated at the 
University of Bergen, to join the Foreign Ministry’s Sudan team (Ibid.).   
While CMI took the appointment in stride, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) 
proved less willing to part with its foremost Sudan expert, Halvor Aschjem.  
According to NCA Secretary General Atle Sommerfeldt, Frafjord Johnson “poached” 
Aschjem from NCA (Sommerfeldt 30 March 2007).  Up until this point, NCA had 
regularly engaged with the Foreign Ministry in a dialogue on the situation in the 
Sudan (Ibid.).  Sommerfeldt explains that in response to Frafjord Johnson’s request, 
“of course I had to say ‘yes,’ but the problem was that we [NCA] then lost our 
investment, so to say,” (Ibid.).  With the new appointment, Aschjem “became a 
                                              
25 Initially, the IPF was called the “Friends of IGAD.” 
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diplomat overnight” and was no longer affiliated with NCA (Ibid.).  Thus, although 
NCA could boast that its former Regional Representative to the Sudan gained a seat 
at the official IGAD talks, Aschjem had no regular contact with his former employer 
(Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  This became a source of bitterness for NCA during the 
talks. 
Also in 1998, the Secretary General of the UN appointed Tom Vraalsen to the 
post of UN Special Envoy for the Humanitarian Affairs of the Sudan, a position he 
held until 2005 (Norwegian MFA 11 June 1998; Vraalsen 25 April 2008).  Vraalsen 
at that time served as Norway’s Ambassador to the United States, but as stated 
earlier, he had also participated in the Oslo back channel for the Sudan.  As UN 
Special Envoy, Vraalsen’s was charged with ensuring the implementation of 
Operation Lifeline Sudan.  In addition, in March 1999, Norway hosted a meeting of 
the IGAD Partners Forum in Oslo (Norwegian MFA 8 March 1999).  Thus, 
Norway’s role in the IGAD process was entrenched before the negotiations reached a 
critical point. 
4.3.2 Rising/High  
In contrast to the previous cases, the Norwegian NGOs played no official role in 
the IGAD process.  Khartoum and the SPLM/A sought to keep the process closed not 
only to civil society, but also to the rebel leaders of a growing insurgency movement 
in Darfur (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  Instead, several church-based NGOs, including 
NCA, established a parallel “people-to-people” peace-building track through the 
Sudan Ecumenical Council (Villumstad 15 June 2004).  Communication with the 
Foreign Ministry was limited to informal conversations between NGO representatives 
and the Norwegian observer team (Vraalsen 25 April 2008), as well as the NGOs’ 
protests at the exclusivity of the process (Villumstad 15 June 2004). 
Although the Norwegian government upgraded its diplomatic efforts in 1998, 
the IGAD peace process did not gain momentum prior to the inauguration of US 
President George W. Bush (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  Before that time, the US 
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government remained reluctant to engage in the Sudan peace process, preferring a 
military victory by the SPLM/A to a negotiated peace that would grant any political 
authority to an Islamist government known to have granted safe haven to Osama bin 
Laden (Sørbø et al. 1998:32).  Sudan was placed on the State Department’s list of 
state supporters of terrorism as early as 1993, and al-Bashir’s support of Saddam 
Hussein during the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 also earned Khartoum few friends in 
Washington (Woodward 2006:53).   
By 2001,  a motley coalition of Evangelical Christian congressmen and 
representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus, in addition to human rights NGO 
leaders, generated increased pressure on newly-elected US president George W. Bush 
to support the peace process as a means of aiding the southern Sudanese (Ibid.113-
117).  Bush named John Danforth Special Envoy to the Sudan on September 6th.  
Five days later, the events of September 11th only heightened the urgency for 
achieving a negotiated solution (Ibid. 120).   As Woodward observes, for its part: 
“Sudan was motivated largely by the fear that the US might decide to strike out 
quickly against states such as those on the terrorism list” (Ibid.).  According to an 
observer to the IGAD process: 
…Certainly something that the Government of Sudan wanted to come out of 
this process was the normalization of relations with the US… and everything 
that entails.  …Particularly in Machakos… 9/11 was not very distant (Stiansen 
11 April 2008). 
Norway participated in the talks leading to the 2002 Machakos agreement as an 
observer to the IGAD process.  Since 2001, Norway also worked as a member of the 
“troika” of key observer countries, along with the US and the UK (Hødnebø 28 
March 2008; Sumbeiywo 2006:22).  In 2001, Kenyan Lazaro Sumbeiywo was 
appointed mediator of the IGAD forum by host country president, Daniel arap Moi.  
Sumbieywo also mediated talks between the North and the South over additional 
contested territories held “outside of the auspices of IGAD,” to which Norway also 
held observer status (Sumbeiywo 2006:24).  In 2002, the Foreign Ministry invited 
Endre Stiansen, a former colleague of Hødnebø’s at the University of Bergen and a 
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leading Norwegian historian on the Sudan, to join the observer team (Stiansen 11 
April 2008).26 
Crucially, Hilde Frafjord Johnson established a personal connection to both 
SPLM/A leader John Garang and the Vice President in Khartoum, Ali Osman Taha; 
she would support the process by “talking to them either on the phone or privately,” 
(Stiansen 11 April 2008).27  Her role began prior to the Machakos negotiations, and 
Kenya’s chief negotiator, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, was aware of Frafjord Johnson’s 
contact with the parties throughout (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  As Stiansen explains, 
there was never a concern that Frafjord Johnson was establishing “a separate 
Norwegian track to try to… upstage Sumbeiywo,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  By 
2001, Norway pursued a clear strategy to “ensure the IGAD track was the only 
track,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008), in contrast to the approach taken in 1994, and in 
opposition to a joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative to host a separate mediation channel.  
In addition, Norway was one of the major donors to the IGAD process, assisted by 
flexible budget roles that allow the Foreign Ministry to quickly approve financing 
with a minimum of bureaucratic hurdles (Stiansen 11 April 2008; Vraalsen 25 April 
2008). 
 The IGAD observers “had joint meetings with the mediation [Sumbeiywo] 
every night,” and “also worked together with the parties,” (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  
Within the troika, the US, UK and Norway discussed the various proposals and “tried 
to hammer out common positions,” (Ibid.).  According to Hødnebø, the parties were 
“more or less aware” of disagreements among the troika members and “there was an 
intense effort on their part to get us on their side on the different issues,” (Ibid.).  
                                              
26 Stiansen was a researcher in Sudanese economic history at the Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) 
prior to the appointment, but had briefed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Sudan previously (Stiansen 11 
April 2008). 
27 Halvor Aschjem knew both government and SPLM representatives from his work with NCA (Kelleher 2006:299) and as 
stated earlier, through his participation in the secret back channel in 1994.  Hence, he may have assisted Hilde Frafjord 
Johnson in establishing such a close connection with the parties.   
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Hødnebø confirms that the parties were “absolutely” negotiating both with each other 
and with the observers (Ibid.). 
The Machakos Protocol marked a revolutionary change in the ongoing 
Sudanese peace process (Haysom 2006:28; Stiansen 11 April 2008).  Signed in July 
2002, the Protocol for the first time opened the door to Southern secession, after an 
interim period of six years.  In addition, the parties agreed that sharia law would 
apply to Muslims in the north, but not to non-Muslims, even those residing in the 
north.   In 2003 and 2004, the IGAD process also produced agreements on security, 
power sharing and wealth sharing.  Outside of the IGAD framework, in 2004 the 
parties agreed to resolution of the Abyei conflict (largely through US-led mediation) 
and to the conflict in the Blue Nile states and Southern Kordofan.  Sumbeiywo 
explains that these agreements were initially outside the Machakos framework and 
the Government of Sudan refused to allow their inclusion in the IGAD process 
(Sumbeiywo 2006:24).  The resulting negotiations involved the same observers and 
Sumbeiywo as the chief mediator, but under the auspices of an ad hoc Kenyan-led 
negotiating framework (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). 
Following a stalemate in the negotiations in late 2002 and early 2003, Frafjord 
Johnson proved instrumental in encouraging the parties to attend talks in Naivasha 
(Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  Garang famously proclaimed that he would come for 
“only one day,” but the negotiations ended up lasting one and a half years (Hødnebø 
28 March 2008; Sumbeiywo 2006:25).  Regarding Frafjord Johnson’s role in 
Naivasha, Hødnebø explains: 
This was not publicly very well known: the system was that I was in the field 
talking to the parties and saw what the differences were on specific issues.  And 
then I would call her [Frafjord Johnson] and she would then have the telephone 
numbers to John Garang and Ali Osman Taha…. Hilde would then talk to the 
two tops and mediate... because there were weeks when they really didn’t talk 
to each other….  So at certain moments we had the feeling that [there] were 
only three persons who really knew what was going on: it was Hilde and the 
two of them [Taha and Garang].  Then they would know that both of them had 
talked to her and they would know each other’s point [of view]…. So by the 
next meeting, they would have talked to her and they would have moved.  So 
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the next meeting would be to explore the way forward and then, you know, 
kind of say, “Ok, you know I know that you have talked to Hilde.”  And then… 
they would move…  And then gradually this would happen over part of the 
time (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). 
Hødnebø confirms that while the Government of Sudan pursued negotiations 
“to keep the SPLM in the fold,” Khartoum often perceived that “their real counterpart 
was Washington,” particularly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (28 March 2008).  He 
explains: 
You can imagine while Washington attacks Iraq... people in Khartoum are dead 
nervous of being the next target.  You negotiate in order not to be the next 
target (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). 
However, in Stiansen’s estimation, the impact of the Iraq war was “first, to take 
the pressure off the negotiations,” and “second, in ruling out many of the …worst 
scenarios for Khartoum,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  Regardless of their impact, the 
Americans began to grate on the nerves of the UN mediators and the fellow observer 
countries by 2004, when the domestic pressure of the presidential re-election 
campaign increased the Bush administration’s eagerness to achieve a foreign policy 
victory in Sudan (Hødnebø 28 March 2008; Sumbeiywo 2006:25).  According to 
Sumbeiywo: 
In early 2004 they [the Americans] even brought an aircraft and said, “Let’s 
sign an agreement half way so that the parties can attend the State of the Union 
Address.” I resisted that (Sumbeiywo 2006:25). 
Nevertheless, Stiansen cautions that “one should not overestimate third parties’ 
ability to influence these things,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  Hødnebø echoes that “we 
shouldn’t underestimate the pressure from Sudanese themselves—from many 
groups,” including “the high command in the military” in southern Sudan (Hødnebø 
28 March 2008).  Regardless of the ultimate source of pressure, on January 9, 2005, 
the SPLM and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) following 16 months of negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya.  The 
CPA consists of six protocol agreements: (1) the aforementioned Machakos, (2) 
agreements on power sharing and (3) wealth sharing, (4) the special administration of 
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Abyei, (5) the agreement on Sourthern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States and (6) 
security arrangements.  The terms of the Machakos protocol have already been 
summarized, but the main thrust of the CPA also includes a formula for sharing 
future oil revenues, integrating security forces and quotas for political representation 
of the SPLM and the northern government, under the auspices of the National 
Congress Party (NCP).  
4.3.3 Declining 
From shortly after the signing of the CPA until 2007, Norway chaired the 
Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC), charged with overseeing the 
implementation (Vraalsen 25 April 2008). However, the AEC got off to a slow start 
following the death of SPLM leader John Garang in a helicopter crash in the summer 
of 2005 (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  Tom Vraalsen led the Norwegian AEC 
contingent, which was comprised entirely of personnel affiliated with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Vraalsen 25 April 2005), including Endre Stiansen.  The AEC 
members included regional organizations such as the African Union, the League of 
Arab States and the European Union, as well as the Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, the UK 
and Norway.  Norway also sent a small contingent of 27 staff officers and UN 
observers to Sudan to assist the UN peacekeeping force authorized by the Security 
Council in March 2005 (Ellingsen 2006; Isaksen Wangberg 2005).  In comparison, 
by 2006, the total UN Mission in Sudan consisted of approximately 10,000 military 
and police officers (Sudan-UNMIS-Background 2008). 
Additionally, Norway hosted a donor conference for Sudan in Oslo in April 
2005, resulting in pledges of over 4.5 billion US dollars from a broad spectrum of 
states and international organizations (Norwegian MFA 12 April 2005).  Much of 
Norway’s diplomatic engagement on the Sudan issue since that time has been 
focused on ensuring these pledges are fulfilled (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).  In 
addition, the Foreign Ministry established a “framework for peace-building” in 2005, 
based partly on an influential report published by the Christian Michelsen Institute 
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(Frafjord Johnson 2005).  The report recommended greater third party coordination, 
particularly among donors, and a more sustained approach to peace-building than 
simply the absence of violence (Sørbø 2004:16-18). Rather, international efforts 
should be based on building up functioning institutions and civic organizations 
equipped to deal with future conflicts in a peaceful manner (Ibid.). 
 Norway contributed significant financial resources to the implementation 
efforts, although the US was the largest donor in real terms (Vraalsen 25 April 2008).  
In 2007, Sudan received “the most Norwegian aid of any country, a total of NOK 700 
million,” of which the lion’s share was deposited into two multi-donor trust funds, in 
addition to support to the UN System (Stiansen 21 January 2007).  However, the 
multi-donor trust funds “are very complex instruments” with a comprehensive list of 
bureaucratic procurement rules that preclude rapid transfers to a new administration.  
Navigating the management rules of the multi-donor trust funds required an 
organizational capacity and level of experience that the SPLM lacked (Stiansen 11 
April 2008).   The administrative demands of implementing the CPA exposed 
weaknesses in the SPLM structure, including a “top-heavy administration” and a lack 
of “administrative experience,” (Ibid.). While many in the SPLM are “extremely 
capable,” after over 20 years of civil war, the SPLM was “probably a little bit naïve 
about what it would take… to run a modern government under very difficult 
circumstances,” (Ibid.). 
According to Tom Vraalsen, National Congress Party (NCP) intransigence is 
the main obstacle to full implementation of the CPA (25 April 2008).   Since 
Garang’s death, the NCP has sought to marginalize its lead negotiator in Naivasha, 
Ali Osman Taha, and maintain control over the SPLM as a “junior partner in the 
government (ICG 2008:1; Vraalsen 25 April 2008).  Although renewed warfare 
seems unlikely, the NCP continues to “block… implementation of provisions 
necessary for the 2011 southern referendum,” (ICG 2008:1).  The International Crisis 
Group also observes that the SPLM “has been dealing with serious internal tensions 
since Garang’s death in July 2005,” (Ibid. 5).  Morover, since the eruption of the 
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conflict in Darfur in 2003, the attention of the international community has drifted 
west, lifting pressure on the parties to fulfill the terms of the CPA.  While the 
situation in Darfur derives from its own complex mixture of historical, political, 
cultural and environmental factors, undoubtedly, the CPA contributed to the rebels’ 
discontent (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  By dividing political power largely along north-
south lines, the CPA shut out the rebels in Darfur from national-level political 
authority, leaving Darfur “in the northern Sudan, at the mercy of the NCP,” (Ibid.).   
Thus, although a full assessment of the CPA requires a longer time horizon, it is 
fair to say that implementation is lagging.  According to Vraalsen, “everything is 
delayed” in terms of the various steps to implementation spelled out in the CPA.   In 
addition, Vraalsen explains: 
Part of the problem is that [on the] 9th of January, 2005, when the agreement 
was signed, a large number of countries witnessed that.  They signed on to it: 
the United States, Norway, the UK, Netherlands, Italy, the EU as such, World 
Bank, UN—I mean, you name it.  On the 10th of January, everybody was 
looking at Darfur (Ibid.). 
The ongoing war in Darfur consumes both the time and resources of the 
international diplomatic and donor community. At the time of writing, it remains an 
open question as to whether implementation of the CPA will continue through 2011as 
planned. 
4.3.4 Preliminary Assessment 
Table 4.3.4 details the mediation cycle framework for Norway’s role in the 
IGAD peace process.  In the “low intensity” phase, the Sudan case corresponds 
closely to the theoretical mediation cycle framework, with the significant exception 
of the failed attempt to negotiate a peace agreement through a Norwegian back 
channel.  The structure of the failed channel, according to existing documentation, 
appears similar to the Middle East case in its involvement of a staff member from a 
Norwegian NGO (Norwegian Church Aid) and a small group of officials from the 
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Foreign Ministry, including Vraalsen and Egeland.  The dissolution of the track left 
the mediation cycle within the “low intensity” phase once more. 
 In the “rising/high intensity” phase, the Sudan case differs significantly from 
the original framework.  The Norwegian Foreign Ministry did not cooperate closely 
with Norwegian NGOs.  Rather, the Minister of Development recruited NCA veteran 
Halvor Aschjem to join the Ministry.  Frafjord Johnson also recruited academic 
experts on Sudan to the observer team, and the Norwegian Ambassador to the US, 
Tom Vraalsen, assisted the UN Secretary-General.  Norway hosted the observers for 
meetings in Norway, but the core negotiations between the parties occurred in Kenya.  
Frafjord Johnson directed Norwegian engagement in the Sudan, serving as the chair 
of the IGAD observers and mediating personally between the two principals.  
Norway’s efforts during this phase occurred solely within the framework of the 
IGAD talks.  Lastly, the breakthrough in Machakos followed increased US 
involvement after the September 11th terrorist attacks. 
Table 4.3.4 Mediation Cycle Framework for the Sudan Case 
Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
• NCA and NPA develop 
presence in the local region.  
NCA  begins conflict 
resolution activities in 
addition to existing 
development projects 
• Norwegian back channel 
between Khartoum and 
SPLM collapses after four 
meetings 
• Khartoum and SPLM accept 
Norwegian membership in 
IGAD due to Norway’s lack 
of colonial past, lack of 
material interest in conflict 
and history of foreign aid to 
region. 
• The US prefers military 
solution to negotiated peace 
 
• Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
recruits NCA expert and 
Norwegian academics with 
knowledge of Sudan to IGAD 
observer team  
• Norwegian Development 
Minister mediates informally 
between Garang and Taha to 
support IGAD process 
•  Norwegian actors invite 
IGAD observers to Norway, 
but with full knowledge of 
troika and UN mediation team 
• A breakthrough in talks 
occurs following increased US 
involvement after September 
11th  
 
• Norway continues to support 
grassroots peace process 
indirectly through funding to 
NCA’s Sudan Ecumenical 
Council 
• IGAD observers and regional 
organizations form AEC to 
ensure implementation.  UN 
System and multi-donor trust 
funds used to provide aid to 
assist with implementation 
• Norway pledges development aid 
through above channels, 
contributes troops to UN 
observer force, and hosts donor 
conference.  Norwegian 
diplomatic presence sustained, 
but remains in background and 
in cooperation with UN and 
AEC 
 
In the “declining intensity” phase, Norwegian support to grassroots peace 
building occurred indirectly through the usual funding of NCA, which led “people-to-
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people” ecumenical initiatives.  Norway hosted a donors’ conference in April 2005, 
and pledged significant amount of its own resources to the implementation, through 
two multi-donor trust funds and the UN System.  It also sent 27 military officers and 
UN observers to assist the UN Mission in Sudan.  Furthermore, Norway chaired the 
AEC from 2005 to 2007, and its diplomatic efforts support the multilateral 
framework, rather than a unilateral Norwegian initiative.  
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5. Comparative Analysis 
The three cases examined highlight significant variation in the procedural and 
contextual variables among common examples of the “Norwegian model.”  In this 
section, I return to my research questions posed in the introduction and the methods 
chapters, namely: (1) what is the “Norwegian model?” and (2) what are its strengths 
and limitations?   The first section of this chapter compares the cases according to the 
variables outlined in Table 3.3.1 of the methods chapter.  The second section 
analyzes the cases according to the hypothesized strengths and limitations of the 
“Norwegian model.”  
5.1 Comparison of Cases 
5.1.1 Independent Variables: Contextual 
This section describes the independent variables that form the context for the 
Norwegian efforts in the three cases.  In terms of the background characteristics of 
the conflict, the three cases encompass a wide degree of variation.  However, the 
legitimacy of the non-state group proved a contentious issue in all three cases.   In the 
Middle East and Guatemala, the US had tacitly or openly supported the government 
side and opposed the rebel organizations, which in both cases had received at least 
ideological support from the Soviet Union.  In contrast, in the Sudan case, the US 
government preferred the SPLM to the government side, due to the latter’s links to 
Islamic terrorism.  In addition, the conflicts in the Middle East and Guatemala 
involved two main belligerents.  In the Sudan, the situation was less clear.  Although 
the IGAD process addressed the conflict between the North and the South, this was 
only one of many overlapping civil wars in the Sudan.  By 2003, the conflict in 
Darfur began to overshadow the North-South divide. 
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Table 5.1.1 Comparison of Contextual Independent Variables 
 Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
Middle 
East 
• Conflict issues include territory 
and religion 
• Two main parties: Israel and 
PLO 
• PLO not recognized in official 
US-led multilateral negotiations 
• Labour government elected in 
Israel 
• PLO weakened following Gulf 
War 
• Norway informs US 
during beginning of 
channel 
• Both Israel and PLO 
maintain contact with 
regional and 
international allies 
(and each other) 
regarding channel 
• AHLC directs 
assistance to 
occupied territories, 
but members wary 
of providing military 
support and also, of 
funding Palestinian 
security force 
• PLO fails to halt 
terrorist attacks on 
Israel 
• Israel continues 
building of 
settlements 
Guatemal
a 
• Conflict issues include 
socioeconomic inequality and 
ethnicity 
• Two main parties: government 
and URNG 
• US support to government; 
URNG listed as terrorist group 
• Increase in international 
economic pressure on 
Guatemalan government  
• Loss of ideological and military 
support to government from 
abroad 
• Multi-state Group of 
Friends supports peace 
process 
• UN becomes mediator 
• MINUGUA 
monitoring force 
deployed 
• “Four Councils” lead 
civil society meetings 
(ASCs) 
• NCA conducts parallel 
civil society peace-
building  
• MINUGUA 
observers monitor 
implementation 
• Consultative Group 
of donor countries 
directs aid flows to 
Guatemala 
Sudan • Conflict issues include political 
control over territory and 
resources, ethnicity and religion 
• Two main parties (government 
and SPLM), but many others as 
well; various conflicts 
• US support for SPLM 
• IGAD forum of neighboring 
states begins peace negotiations 
on Sudan 
• Troika (US, UK and 
Norway) supports 
IGAD process, along 
with additional 
observers 
• More assertive US 
pressure against 
Khartoum after 
September 11th 
terrorist attacks 
• Assessment and 
Evaluation 
Commission (AEC) 
monitors status of 
implementation 
• World Bank directs 
multi-donor trust 
funds 
• UNMIS observers 
monitor 
implementation 
During the negotiations, the status of the conflict did not change significantly in 
any of the cases examined.  That is, neither side led a decisive military attack against 
the other such that the balance of power on the ground shifted towards one party.  
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The military stalemate that held at the initiation of negotiations remained in place 
throughout.  Rather, momentum within the process itself, as well as changes in the 
external international environment, appeared far more instrumental in driving the 
talks forward.  Table 5.1.1 details the contextual factors that emerged to push 
negotiations forward.  In each case, international attention to the conflict helped to 
strengthen internal pressure for a negotiated solution.  In terms of the involvement of 
additional third parties, the US played a key role in each of the cases studied.  In 
addition, the involvement of civil society actors in Guatemala contrasts starkly with 
the Middle East case, in which civil society organizations were not even aware of the 
negotiations.  In Sudan, the organizations leading the civil society peace track were 
aware of negotiations, but had no connection to the IGAD talks.   
In the “declining intensity” phase, various international organizations and ad 
hoc multi-lateral committees directed aid flows in all three cases.  However, the 
willingness of international actors to exert pressure varied significantly.  In the 
Middle East case, the international members of the AHLC demonstrated the least 
resolve to ensure implementation proceeded on schedule, balking at measures that 
might prove politically uncomfortable.   
5.1.2 Independent Variables: Process  
 Table 5.1.2 provides a comparison of the three cases according to the 
procedural independent variables, that is, the behavior of the Norwegian actors.  In 
the “low intensity” phase, the three cases differ with respect to the initiative taken by 
NGOs and by the state.  In the Guatemala case, NGOs led Norwegian entry into the 
peace process, whereas the Foreign Ministry alone participated in the IGAD talks.  
The parties and observers to the IGAD talks consisted only of state entities; hence, 
the Minister of Development was not realistically able to open the process to NGOs 
on her own initiative.  Nonetheless, the absence of NGOs in the negotiations contrasts 
with the previous two cases. 
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Table 5.1.2 Comparison of Procedural Independent Variables 
 Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
Middle 
East 
• Close historical relationship 
between Norway and Israel, 
especially through respective 
Labour parties 
• Norwegian diplomatic 
contact with PLO since 1978 
• Rød-Larsen leads Fafo 
research on living conditions 
in Gaza 
• Series of secret 
negotiations held in and 
around Oslo from January 
to August 1993, involving 
small group of diplomats 
and Rød-Larsen.  
• Mediation strategy initially 
facilitative, but becomes 
more assertive with Holst  
• Foreign Ministry funds 
channel through Fafo 
• Norway chairs 
AHLC and sends 
troops for TIPH 
• Foreign Ministry 
supports 
grassroots peace 
process initiatives 
such as P2P 
(through which 
Fafo takes lead) 
 
Guatemala • LWF accepted as mediator in 
1989 
• Stålsett asks Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry to host 
secret peace talks in Oslo 
• Petter Skauen of NCA 
contacted to assist in 
selecting participants 
• Secret talks held in Oslo in 
1990 
•  Norway supports civil 
society meetings held by 
NGOs 
• Foreign Ministry funds 
URNG through NGOs 
• Norway joins Group of 
Friends in 1992 
• Norway continues 
to support 
grassroots peace 
process through 
Norwegian NGOs 
• Norway pledges 
development aid 
tied to eventual 
peace agreement  
Sudan • Norwegian research 
institutes active in the Sudan 
since the 1960’s 
• NCA and NPA establish 
presence in the Sudan in 
1970’s and 1980’s. NPA 
sides openly with SPLM 
• Norway hosts secret peace 
talks between GoS and SPLM 
in 1994, but these collapse 
after four meetings 
• Norwegian Minister of 
International Development 
named chair of IGAD 
Partners Forum in 1998.  
Frafjord Johnson recruits 
members of NGOs and 
research institutes to 
Norway’s IGAD observer 
team 
• Norway attends Sudan 
peace talks as member of 
multi-state Friends of 
IGAD 
• Frafjord Johnson 
communicates with Taha 
and Garang by phone from 
Oslo, helping to break 
impasses in official 
mediation 
• Foreign Ministry assists in 
funding IGAD forum 
• Norwegian observer team’s 
academic expertise utilized 
in various IGAD meetings 
• Norwegian Ambassador 
Vraalsen serves as UN 
Special Envoy for 
implementation of OLS 
• Norway supports 
grassroots peace 
process indirectly 
through funding 
to NCA’s Sudan 
Ecumenical 
Council 
• Norway hosts 
donor conference 
for Sudan and 
chairs AEC 
• Small Norwegian 
military 
contingent 
deployed to 
support UNMIS  
 
In the Middle East case, Rød-Larsen worked in concert with the Foreign 
Ministry, but the Norwegian state’s involvement with the two parties began decades 
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before Fafo conducted its surveying of the living conditions in Gaza.  Rød-Larsen’s 
title as the director of Fafo served a useful purpose as a cover for official 
negotiations, but he informed only a handful of colleagues at Fafo about his activities. 
Strategy and mediation tactics were determined solely in cooperation with the 
Foreign Ministry. 
In the “rising/high” phase, the three cases vary according to the level of 
autonomy the Norwegian actors enjoyed as mediators.  While the Oslo back channel 
for the Middle East consisted exclusively of a small group of Norwegian mediators, 
the Guatemala case began through cooperation between NGOs and the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry and quickly expanded to include the UN, the Group of Friends and 
numerous civil society organizations.  Lastly, in the Sudan case, Norwegian 
mediation efforts in the context of the IGAD forum occurred solely through a 
multilateral process.  Although Frafjord Johnson played a unique role, her efforts 
depended on the acceptance of the official IGAD mediator, Lazaro Sumbeiywo. 
In the “declining intensity” phase, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and 
Norwegian NGOs remained engaged in the conflict region in all three cases: through 
troop contributions to peacekeeping forces in the Middle East (in Hebron) and the 
Sudan and through long-term development aid in all three cases.  Norway continued 
to serve as a mediator for the parties only in the Middle East case, but the Foreign 
Ministry established a diplomatic presence in all three cases through Norwegian 
consulates and/or embassies in the regions.   In all three cases, Norwegian NGOs 
contributed to development work and peace-building initiatives in the implementation 
phase. 
5.1.3 Dependent Variables: Outcome 
In all three cases, the parties accepted offers of mediation and began 
negotiations directly afterwards.  In the Sudan case, however, the first mediation 
attempt ended without agreement.  In terms of the mediation cycle framework, 
negotiations ended in the “rising/high” phase and returned to the “low” phase.  
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Nevertheless, the IGAD mediation picked up momentum in 2001 and the 
negotiations reached a turning point in Machakos in 2002.   
Table 5.1.3 Comparison of Dependent Variables: Outcome 
 Low Intensity Rising/High Intensity Declining Intensity 
Middle East • Parties accept 
Norwegian 
mediation as back 
channel to official 
multilateral 
negotiations 
• Written agreement 
on framework for 
peace process: 1993 
Oslo Accords 
• Implementation lags 
and eventually falls 
apart 
Guatemala • Parties accept LWF-
led mediation held 
in Norway 
• Six written 
agreements signed 
from 1990-1996 
address root causes 
of conflict and 
ceasefire 
• Implementation 
more or less 
complete: military 
ceasefire, but 
increase in crime 
Sudan • Parties accept offer 
of Norwegian back 
channel, but 
negotiations fail 
• Parties accept 
Norway as member 
of IGAD Partners 
Forum 
• 2005 
Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
addresses all core 
issues of North-
South conflict, but 
not conflict in 
Darfur 
• Implementation 
lagging  on all fronts 
• Completion date set 
for 2011, including 
referendum on 
independence of 
Southern Sudan 
 
All three cases resulted in the signing of a written agreement.  In the Oslo 
channel for the Middle East, the agreement consisted of a framework for further 
negotiations.  The time between the initiation of negotiations and the signing of a 
written agreement was also the shortest of the three cases: from January to August 
1993.  In the Guatemala case, negotiations lasted from 1990 to 1996 and resulted in 
six separate agreements that together formed a comprehensive peace treaty.  The 
URNG refused to agree to a ceasefire until the substantive issues were negotiated.  In 
the Sudan case, the 2002 Machakos Protocol laid out a framework for negotiations, 
opening the door for the eventual secession of Southern Sudan and a compromise on 
religion allowing sharia law to apply in the north, but not in the south.  The final 
negotiations began in Naivasha, Kenya in 2003, resulting in the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005.  Although the CPA can be 
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considered a comprehensive North-South agreement, it did not address the conflict in 
Darfur.   
Of the three cases examined, the Guatemala peace agreement has been most 
successfully implemented.  Although a sharp increase in crime rates followed the 
signing of the 1996 ceasefire agreement, Guatemala has not experienced a return to 
armed conflict between warring parties.  The Oslo Accords for the Middle East 
collapsed completely; Israel continued to build new settlements in the occupied 
territories and the PLO failed to halt terrorist attacks against Israel.  At the time of 
writing, the success or failure of the CPA for Sudan remains an open question.  
However, by 2008, implementation lagged on all fronts. The referendum on secession 
is set to be held in 2011, but preparatory measures have yet to be implemented.  In 
the interim, the conflict in Darfur continues to consume the resources and attention of 
the international community, suggesting third-party enforcement measures of the 
CPA are likely to be limited. 
5.2 Strengths and Limitations 
Based on the comparative analysis of three cases of the “Norwegian model,” 
the following section addresses the potential strengths and limitations of Norwegian 
state-NGO cooperation listed in Table 2.3.1 on page 20 of Chapter Two.  The 
mediation cycle framework used to organize the empirical presentation illustrates 
how the demands of a peace process evolve as negotiations proceed.  While the 
strengths of the “Norwegian model” apply overwhelmingly to the “low intensity” and 
“rising/high intensity” phases, the “declining intensity” phase requires the leadership 
of a more powerful actor.  This finding suggests that the comparative advantage 
enjoyed by Norwegian actors during the first two phases may allow for a valuable 
contribution towards conflict resolution.  However, the ultimate success or failure of 
a peace process depends only to a rather limited extent on Norwegian efforts. 
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5.2.1 Strengths 
Deniability 
The potential advantage of “deniability” within the “Norwegian model” refers 
to the ability both for the parties to deny the existence of official negotiations and for 
the Norwegian state to channel aid to a belligerent non-state actor through a 
Norwegian NGO. In the Middle East case and for the first negotiations held in Oslo 
in the Guatemala case, cooperation between the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and 
NGOs allowed the parties to conceal their involvement in direct negotiations with the 
opposing side.  In the Middle East case, maintaining the secrecy of the channel was 
absolutely decisive for the parties’ participation.  Both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians faced a real threat from hardliners within their own sides if word leaked 
of peace talks with the enemy.  Moreover, the Israelis also had an interest in 
concealing the talks from the US during the most critical stage, forestalling potential 
interference in the eventual agreement.  Under the auspices of Fafo, Rød-Larsen 
arranged the secret meetings as “academic seminars” and the Foreign Ministry 
covered Fafo’s expenses through ambiguous funding requests signed by the State 
Secretary. 
In the Guatemala case, the parties demonstrated their concern for maintaining 
deniability by sending negotiators with strong connections to their respective leaders, 
but not the principals themselves.  The Committee for International and Ecumenical 
Relations of the State Church of Norway officially hosted the meeting, with 
assistance from the Lutheran World Federation.  Petter Skauen of Norwegian Church 
Aid attended the talks, but as a representative of LWF.  Although the parties held the 
talks in secret, they agreed to a formal announcement of the Oslo Agreement for 
Guatemala on March 30, 1990—an official acknowledgement that a peace process 
had begun. 
In the Sudan case, the initiation and eventual collapse of the 1994 back channel 
remained secret until exposed by a Norwegian newspaper.  However, the IGAD 
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mediation occurred openly.  That is, although the content of the talks was held secret, 
the existence of direct negotiations between the government in Khartoum and the 
SPLM/A was public information.  As a result, there was no need for NGOs to provide 
a cover for negotiations. In sum, the variation among the three cases suggests that 
deniability can be a significant advantage of state-NGO cooperation and also, 
perhaps, a motivating factor for the same.  Hence, the lack of cooperation in the 
Sudan case may derive in part due to the openness of the IGAD process from the 
beginning.  A cover operation was unnecessary. 
One factor highlighted by the accounts of the three back channels is the 
importance of secretive and flexible funding mechanisms.  The Foreign Ministry 
funded secret talks for the Middle East, Guatemala and Sudan without arousing 
suspicion from the Ministry’s accounting department.  The ability to move funds 
quickly without bureaucratic oversight proved extremely useful in maintaining the 
secrecy of all three channels.  It also allowed the Foreign Ministry to fund rebel 
groups classified as terrorist organizations by the United States.  Rather than support 
these organizations directly, the Norwegian state funnelled financial assistance 
through NGOs.  In the Guatemala case, this occurred relatively openly and proved a 
source of contention with the Guatemalan government at times.  Nonetheless, 
channelling funds through the NGOs provided at least a semblance of distance for the 
Foreign Ministry and did not appear to attract significant protest from Norwegian 
allies. 
Local knowledge 
In all three of the cases examined, Norwegian NGO staff members’ expertise 
and local contact networks provided the Norwegian Foreign Ministry with valuable 
(and often, essential) links to the local context.  With the exception of the Middle 
East case, Norwegian NGOs’ presence in the conflict region preceded that of the 
Foreign Ministry.  This occurred in 1994 for Sudan as well, although the negotiations 
proved unsuccessful.  According to a Norwegian diplomat responsible in 2003 for 
compiling the Foreign Ministry’s internal analysis of Norwegian peace mediation: 
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When Norwegian authorities came into the peace efforts in, for example, 
Guatemala, “the table was already set” through the network of contacts Petter 
Skauen (Norwegian Church Aid) had established and the trust and respect he 
had earned, not least within civil society (Sjøberg 22 April 2008). 
In the Sudan case, the Minister of Development recruited NGO and research 
institute personnel with a wealth of knowledge about the conflict.  This knowledge 
base, including Frafjord Johnson’s own background, allowed the Norwegian 
observers to play an influential role in supporting the mediation—far in excess of 
what might be expected of a small country with no ostensible interest in the Sudan.  
In short, local knowledge clearly proved to be a major advantage of state-NGO 
collaboration in all three of the cases studied. 
Trusted mediators 
The presence of NGO staff in the negotiations may increase the parties’ trust in 
the mediators.  However, the corollary is that participating in mediation may damage 
trust in the NGO on the ground.  For example, Norwegian Church Aid decided not to 
take a visible role in the 1990 Oslo negotiations for Guatemala out of fear that doing 
so might place local staff members at risk.  Nevertheless, Petter Skauen’s personal 
reputation for integrity, built through over 20 years of development work in 
Guatemala, earned respect from both the government and URNG negotiators.  
Likewise, LWF’s religious character likely contributed to a sense of trust in the 
mediation—or in any case, more so than would be expected for a team consisting 
solely of diplomats from a sovereign state. 
In the Middle East case, Rød-Larsen’s relationship with Fathi Arafat and Yossi 
Beilin undoubtedly helped to build a sense of trust in the Fafo leader.  However, 
members of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry enjoyed even deeper connections with 
the parties: in particular, Longva’s relationship with Yassir Arafat and the Norwegian 
Labour party’s strong ties to its Israeli counterpart.  Johan Jørgen Holst could also 
boast of good relations with the Palestinians, although he was less popular with the 
Israelis.  Therefore, in contrast to the Guatemala case, both the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry and NGOs were considered trusted mediators.  In fact, accounts of the Oslo 
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back channel written by the Israeli and Palestinian actors, respectively, refer almost 
exclusively to “the Norwegians,” rather than distinguishing between NGO personnel 
and the diplomats from the Foreign Ministry. 
In the Sudan case, neither the Foreign Ministry nor the recruited NGO 
personnel and academics enjoyed a personal relationship with any of the parties, with 
the exception of Halvor Aschjem, who also assisted the Ministry with the failed back 
channel in 1994.  Hødnebø and Stiansen knew who the leaders were on both sides, 
but neither of them knew any of the actors personally prior to the negotiations.  
Similarly, Frafjord Johnson became acquainted with Garang and Taha after assuming 
the post of Minister of Development and the Environment. 
Overall, the cases demonstrate that trusted NGO personnel are a definite asset to 
a mediation team, although it is perhaps rare to find potential mediators who have 
established good personal relationships with both sides.  Due to the difference in the 
average tenure of NGO field representatives vs. diplomats in a single region, it is 
more likely NGO personnel would develop such contacts, but the example of NPA’s 
explicit political stance in the Sudan conflict suggests that NGOs with a long-term 
presence in the region may, alternatively, generate tremendous hostility from one of 
the sides. 
Streamlined cooperation 
In the foreword to Norwegian edition of BBC journalist Jane Corbin’s account 
of the Oslo peace process, Terje Rød-Larsen, Mona Juul and Jan Egeland cite the 
institutionalization of cooperation between the state and NGOs as one of Norway’s 
main strengths as a peacemaker and also as a factor leading to the Norwegian role in 
Guatemala (Egeland et al. 1994:8).  Egeland maintains that the “Norwegian model” 
of peace mediation in particular became institutionalized in the 1990’s (22 October 
2007).  While cooperation between the Norwegian state and Norwegian NGOs in 
peace mediation has indeed proceeded relatively smoothly, it is hardly 
“institutionalized.” Rather, the level of institutionalization evident in development 
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cooperation between the Norwegian state and these same NGOs contrasts with the 
type of ad hoc partnerships found in peace mediation.  As the cases demonstrate, the 
particular form of cooperation varied significantly from the Middle East, to 
Guatemala and the Sudan and often occurred through fortuitous connections and 
informal relationships.  
Nevertheless, in each of the three cases examined, there was an institutionalized 
willingness on the part of both the Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian NGOs to 
work with one another.  Where the “Norwegian model” appears particularly one-
sided, as in the Sudan, the reasons for a lack of cooperation stem not from a lack of 
trust, but rather, from procedural concerns and pressure from the parties themselves.  
When the Norwegian Foreign Ministry enters multilateral negotiations as a state 
party, it can be quite difficult to explain why a Norwegian NGO should also be 
offered a seat at the table.  This poses a challenge to integrating the “Norwegian 
model” into a multilateral process.   
In the Sudan, the Minister of Development’s solution was to recruit NGO 
personnel to the Norwegian observer team, utilizing Norwegian expertise on the 
Sudan through the Foreign Ministry’s direction.  While this proved unproblematic for 
academic research institutes, Norwegian development organizations were less than 
pleased with the arrangement.  In Guatemala, Norway’s membership in the Group of 
Friends represented a separate channel to which only state actors were invited.  
Although communication between the Foreign Ministry and Stålsett and Skauen 
occurred on an informal basis, the Norwegian NGOs engaged in development work 
in Guatemala were left largely outside the official process. 
5.2.2 Limitations 
Democratic incompatibility 
While the participation of Norwegian NGOs (and LWF) in the peace processes 
examined may have weakened democratic control over Norwegian foreign policy, 
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there is no indication that the Norwegian public objected to their inclusion.  On the 
contrary, the signing of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East is hailed as Norway’s 
absolute largest diplomatic success and, while it lasted, a strong source of pride 
among ordinary Norwegians.  Moreover, the Norwegian NGOs can hardly be 
considered completely independent of the Foreign Ministry, especially within the 
context of the “Norwegian model.”  The Foreign Ministry holds the purse strings in 
the relationship; given this leverage, it would be perfectly well positioned to end 
cooperation with an NGO that deviated from official Norwegian policy during a 
peace process. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry’s funding of NCA and NPA in the Sudan case 
demonstrates that in the “low intensity” phase, the Foreign Ministry has allowed 
NGOs to pursue widely divergent strategies with respect to an ongoing conflict.  At 
best, this gives the impression of inconsistency in Norwegian foreign policy; at worst, 
it represents an example of NGOs creating de facto Norwegian foreign policy on the 
ground.  This lack of democratic oversight could prove especially problematic with 
displeased local actors who are both aware of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s 
extensive financial support to Norwegian NGOs and are disposed to publicize this 
relationship (and the NGOs’ relation to the conflict) in the international media. 
In addition to the focus on the Norwegian NGOs’ role in determining 
Norwegian foreign policy, the cases highlighted the democratic tensions of 
representation in grassroots peace-building.  In the Guatemala case, the failure of 
local NGOs to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement highlights the 
difficulty of achieving democratic representation in the peace process on a local level.  
The civil society organizations in the ASC meetings certainly presented a more 
complex and comprehensive picture of the various groups with a stake in the conflict, 
but their claims to represent the Guatemalan people were somewhat speculative.  In 
large part, this represents an inevitable dilemma in working within a country 
suffering from decades of civil war.  Civil society institutions are likely to be weak, if 
present at all, and the government and opposition groups are unlikely to have 
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democratic mandates of their own.  In this context, one can credibly argue that the 
ASC process formed the closest approximation to a democratic process that could be 
expected.  Likewise, a major challenge in both the Sudan and the Middle East cases 
was the need to build up local democratic institutions that were capable of 
implementing the agreements at the grassroots level. 
Mutual aims critical 
Given the close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and NGOs within the 
“Norwegian model,” mutual trust among representatives from both sides is absolutely 
essential.  In the Middle East case, certain figures in the Foreign Ministry were 
sceptical of Rød-Larsen’s involvement from the outset.  However, his connection to 
Mona Juul and excellent relationship with Foreign Minister Holst meant that Rød-
Larsen earned the trust of the Foreign Ministry’s decision makers.  As noted earlier, 
the actors involved in the Oslo back channel for the Middle East operated in close 
cooperation with one another, and those who remained involved in the channel 
throughout accepted (or at least, did not oppose) the increasingly activist mediation 
style Holst adopted. 
In the Guatemala case, Stålsett’s close connections to the Norwegian 
government and Skauen’s longtime friendship with Stålsett and members of the 
Ministry ensured both men enjoyed a high level of trust with members of the Foreign 
Ministry.  More importantly, Stålsett trusted the Foreign Ministry to assist in the 
peace process that he had literally brought to their doorstep.  In terms of the 
mediation strategy, there were no strong disagreements that came forth in either the 
literature or the interviews and both the NGO representatives and the Foreign 
Ministry were, for example, in agreement on the importance of a strong UN role in 
the peace process.  In the Sudan, the question of mutual aims was moot.  The 
members of the Norwegian observer team recruited from NGOs and academia were 
employed by the Foreign Ministry; they were responsible to Frafjord Johnson and not 
to their former employers.   
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Consequently, the three cases demonstrate remarkably successful examples of 
cooperation in terms of mutual aims.  When asked if there had been any instances in 
which the Foreign Ministry had not agreed with NCA’s conflict resolution strategy, 
NCA Secretary-General Atle Sommerfeldt cited the example of Mali (Sommerfeldt 
30 March 2007).  He explained that in consequence, the Foreign Ministry declined 
NCA’s proposed offer of involvement, but continued to provide funding for 
development, which NCA then diverted to their conflict resolution efforts (Ibid.).  
While this outside example indicates the Foreign Ministry would simply refrain from 
engaging in a peace process in which it did not share the aims of the potential NGO 
partner, it is unclear what would occur if the state and NGO(s) encountered 
substantial disagreement in the “rising/high intensity” phase—that is, during a peace 
process. 
Diplomats overnight 
Although none of the NGO staff members who participated in the three peace 
processes examined had received any formal diplomatic training, there was no 
evidence to suggest that this created a problem for the mediation efforts.  On the 
contrary, most existing analyses of the peace process praise the work of Rød-Larsen, 
Skauen, Stålsett and Aschem. While the Oslo channel has attracted criticism in recent 
years for suspected bias towards Israel, there is no indication that a lack of diplomatic 
training on Rød-Larsen’s part is related to this charge.  Stiansen spoke of the 
difficulties of understanding the compressed “time dimension” of negotiations, in 
contrast to the world of academia, but adjusted quickly to the situation and continued 
his employment Foreign Ministry as a member of the Assessment and Evaluation 
Committee.  Hence, NGO representatives’ lack of diplomatic training did not appear 
to have any significant negative effect on the mediation in any of the cases studied. 
Mediator without muscles 
In his assessment of the future of Norwegian peace diplomacy, Egeland argues 
that “the time for the ‘lonely wolf’ is coming to an end,” and that peace mediation 
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“has to be ‘multilateralized’ again,” (Egeland 22 October 2007).  As a former 
Undersecretary General to the UN, Egeland is understandably in favor of multilateral 
solutions.  Nevertheless, his assessment of the limitations of Norwegian peace 
mediation is consistent with the cases examined.  In the Middle East, Guatemala and 
Sudan, implementation of the peace agreements succeeded in direct relation to the 
level of international assistance and enforcement.  In the Middle East, Norway 
exerted a tremendous effort to keep the Oslo Agreements afloat, by serving as chair 
of the AHLC, deploying TIPH forces to Hebron and contributing development aid to 
the occupied territories at a level that far exceeded any other state contributor on a per 
capita basis.  Nonetheless, without sustained and concentrated pressure from 
international allies, Norway could not prevent the PLO or Israel from reneging on the 
Oslo framework.  
In the Guatemala case, a strong UN presence was decisive in ensuring the (at 
least partial) implementation of the peace agreement.  Likewise, the NCP’s 
demonstrated unwillingness to implement the terms of the CPA without sustained 
international pressure also demonstrates the importance of multilateralism for the 
implementation of a peace agreement.  Hence, although the “Norwegian model” 
enjoys certain advantages in the negotiations towards a peace agreement, Norwegian 
efforts alone are insufficient in the implementation phase.  In all likelihood, this 
conclusion comes as no surprise for the Norwegian actors involved; however, it 
underscores the need for Norway to exercise an equally intense and sustained effort 
in encouraging multilateral participation in the implementation process as is 
demonstrated during the mediation process leading up to the signing of a peace 
agreement.  Diplomatic energy is also required to persuade the parties to accept the 
assistance of multilateral actors.  Regardless of the context of Norwegian state-NGO 
cooperation in peace mediation, the assistance of more powerful states and/or 
multilateral organizations is essential for successful implementation of a peace 
agreement. 
 
 90 
6. Conclusion 
As an example of multi-party peace mediation, Norwegian state-NGO 
cooperation in the Middle East, Guatemala, and the Sudan illustrates the strengths 
and weaknesses of small state conflict resolution initiatives.  The mediation cycle 
framework for the “Norwegian model,” based on the Crocker, Hampson and Aall 
model, proved a rough fit in the Middle East and the Sudan case, but corresponded 
very closely with the Guatemala case.  Indicative of the level of variation, the cases 
exhibit few similarities in terms of the initiation of mediation.  In the Middle East, 
long-standing political and diplomatic connections, combined with the more recent 
NGO study in Gaza, led to the opening of a back channel to the official negotiations 
in Madrid and Washington.  By contrast, in the Guatemala case, LWF paved the way 
for the Foreign Ministry and Norwegian NGOs to enter the peace process.  In the 
Sudan, Norway’s record of humanitarian assistance, academic expertise, and the 
Minister of Development’s personal engagement led to a key role in supporting the 
IGAD process.   
These findings suggest the “Norwegian model” is less of a “model” than the 
name implies, if the word “model” is conceived of as a recipe for cooperation.  
Rather, the “Norwegian model” is perhaps more accurately described as a pattern of 
cooperation in the sense that all three cases include a combination of various traits 
considered characteristic of the “Norwegian model,” although the cases exhibit a 
range of combinations of these traits.  Above all, the cases demonstrate a distinctive 
openness to state-NGO cooperation in foreign relations—a unique approach for a 
sovereign state.  Through partnerships with Norwegian NGOs, the Foreign Ministry 
utilizes the knowledge base (and in the Middle East and Guatemala cases, the 
networks) of NGO representatives, while granting the NGOs access to the political 
decision making process. Using the NGOs as a front for negotiations also proved 
useful in allowing the negotiating parties to maintain deniability.  The Sudan case 
operated somewhat differently, however, in that the “Norwegian model” proved less 
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of a partnership than a recruitment strategy.  This is nonetheless relatively unique in a 
comparative perspective, in that the Foreign Ministry recruited academics and NGO 
representatives outside of the domestic political arena, but it is hardly the type of 
distinctive cooperation seen in the Middle East and Guatemala cases. Further research 
is required to assess whether the Sudan case is indicative of a new trend in 
Norwegian foreign policy.  An analysis of additional cases, such as Norway’s role in 
Sri Lanka, might prove useful in this regard.  
Although the use of the word “model” is perhaps somewhat misleading, the 
“Norwegian model” is indeed Norwegian in the sense that the presence of a 
Norwegian national in a prominent role within the NGO leadership structure appears 
to be a prerequisite for cooperation.  Although the Lutheran World Federation played 
a major role in the Guatemala peace talks, Norway’s entry into the peace process 
depended on the initiative of Gunnar Stålsett, a former leader of the Norwegian 
Center Party and a member of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee with strong ties to 
the Norwegian government.  In the Middle East and Sudan, only personnel from 
Norwegian NGOs participated in the peace processes.  
Given the high level of cooperation among the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and 
its Canadian, Dutch, Swiss and Nordic counterparts, one might expect a similar 
approach to peace mediation.  Development NGOs and research institutes from the 
above named countries operate globally, including within many of the conflict zones 
addressed through Norwegian mediation.  However, a Foreign Ministry internal 
assessment completed in 2003 emphasized the importance of individual Norwegians 
in leadership roles within the UN in facilitating Norway’s entry into a peace process, 
but makes no mention of any strategy to cultivate ties with nationals of likeminded 
countries (Sjøberg 22 April 2008).  In terms of conflict expertise and ties to the local 
community, non-Norwegian NGOs may thus represent an untapped resource for 
partnerships.   
The relatively closed nature of the “Norwegian model” underscores the 
importance of informal social ties and personal trust in explaining Norwegian state-
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NGO cooperation.  To borrow an expression from game theory, it is easier to enter a 
cooperative relationship within the context of an infinitely repeated game.  The close 
quarters of Norwegian society, combined with a healthy independent media, ensure a 
level of transparency that serves as a check on public officials.  Simply put, 
reputations are both easily well-established and quickly tarnished. Moreover, there is 
a revolving door between the Foreign Ministry and NGOs in Norwegian society.  As 
a result, trust among public actors takes a less institutionalized form than is the case 
in larger countries.  Given the interdependence of Norwegian NGOs and the Foreign 
Ministry, even down to the individual level, social connections provide a much 
stronger bond of trust than institutional ties alone.  This makes cooperation across 
national borders in an area as sensitive as peace mediation more problematic.  
External actors are not beholden to the same reputation constraints and their motives 
may appear more opaque. 
Following the signing of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East, peace mediation 
became a core element of Norwegian foreign policy.  However, the initiation of the 
Guatemala peace process predates the Middle East back channel and occurred under a 
different Norwegian government.  Furthermore, Norway’s enhanced involvement in 
the IGAD forum through the efforts of Frafjord Johnson occurred under a third 
government.  This indicates that peace mediation enjoys support across political lines 
in Norway.  In the Guatemala case, the Foreign Ministry accepted a role without 
hesitation, but did not seek out involvement on its own initiative; LWF took the lead.  
Also, although the Guatemala and Middle East negotiations overlap, none of the 
same actors were involved in both, with the exception of Jan Egeland.  A diplomat in 
the Foreign Ministry confirmed that information sharing among peace mediators 
consisted mainly of informal consultations among diplomats in the various regional 
departments within the Ministry (Sjøberg 22 April 2008).  A comprehensive internal 
review was not undertaken prior to 2003 (Ibid.).   Accordingly, there is little evidence 
of a learning process across cases.  Each adapted in its own way and none of the 
actors interviewed explicitly pointed to “lessons learned” from previous cases.  In 
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fact, those involved in Guatemala on the NGO side stated flatly that the Middle East 
case did not influence their mediating strategy.  
Although institutional changes within the Foreign Ministry—namely, the 
establishment of a separate “Section for Peace and Reconciliation” in 2006—may 
move the “Norwegian model” closer to the definition of a model as a “recipe” than as 
a “pattern,” the findings of the present study indicate the overall impact of these 
changes on the ultimate success of failure of specific peace initiatives will 
undoubtedly prove minimal.  The intent in creating the Section for Peace and 
Reconciliation was to compile the Ministry’s internal competence and experience into 
a single division to facilitate more institutionalized information sharing (Sjøberg 22 
April 2008).  Given the findings of the present study, the new department should 
prove capable of expanding upon the advantages of local knowledge and streamlining 
cooperation, not least by ensuring the availability of flexible financial resources for 
supporting a peace process.  However, there is a danger that visible results will be 
needed to justify the new department’s existence.  This could lead to an overemphasis 
on Norway’s role in mediating a successful peace agreement.  The results of the 
present study suggests the new department should concentrate an equal effort on 
diplomacy among potential implementing powers, such as the UN, the EU and the 
United States, as on the mediation of the conflict itself.  Moreover, maintaining 
deniability may prove more difficult.  Given Norway’s increasingly institutionalized 
prioritization of peace mediation, potential negotiators may be greeted with no small 
degree of suspicion when travelling to Oslo for an ostensible “academic conference.” 
For NGOs, the new department may assist in formalizing cooperation by 
providing a clear point of contact within the Ministry, hence, diminishing the 
importance of social ties.  However, increasing formalization will create a 
corresponding demand for more formal bonds of trust between NGOs and the 
Ministry.  Lastly, the creation of the Section for Peace and Reconciliation may serve 
to prevent a deficit of democracy in Norwegian foreign policy by encouraging the 
development of a comprehensive strategy for humanitarian aid and diplomacy 
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towards a conflict region.  By employing personnel with a singular focus on peace 
and reconciliation, the new department should create incentives for conducting a 
more coherent and consistent foreign policy than was the case in, for example, the 
distribution of humanitarian aid to the Sudan during the 1990’s.   
Regardless, Norwegian actors should remain sober about the success rate for 
peace mediation.  Organizational changes may improve the Norwegian effort, but the 
major constraints to successful peacemaking lie outside of Norwegian influence.  As 
the cases demonstrate, peace agreements result primarily through the efforts of the 
parties themselves, as well as a confluence of fortuitous circumstances, both 
domestically and internationally.  While the three cases of the “Norwegian model” 
examined here underline the potential advantages of the Norwegian contribution, 
agreement on a written document is only one element of the process.  Success in 
peace mediation depends first and foremost on the will of the parties, but also on the 
ability of the mediators to engage in a consistent and cooperative initiative with 
additional third parties throughout the mediation cycle—from the initiation of 
mediation through implementation.  Complementary conflict resolution techniques 
are required from actors with diverse comparative strengths and weaknesses at 
different phases of the cycle.  In short, development of a comprehensive peace 
mediation strategy requires thinking beyond the “Norwegian model.”  
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